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SECURITIES LAW: OVERVIEW AND
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
Neal F. Newman* & Lawrence J. Trautman**
Abstract
This is not your grandfather’s SEC anymore. Rapid technological
change has resulted in novel regulatory issues and challenges, as law and
policy struggles to keep pace. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) reports that “the U.S. capital markets are the deepest, most dynamic,
and most liquid in the world. They also have evolved to become increasingly
fast and extraordinarily complex. It is our job to be responsive and innovative
in the face of significant market developments and trends.” With global
markets increasingly interdependent and interconnected and, “as
technological advancements and commercial developments have changed
how our securities markets operate, our ability to remain an effective
regulator requires us to continuously monitor the market environment and,
as appropriate, adjust and modernize our expertise, rules, regulations, and
oversight tools and activities.” The success or failure of our society, jobs of
a global workplace, and the ability of families everywhere to feed, clothe,
and house themselves depends on the success of the SEC in providing fair
and open access to capital through efficient markets.
Our paper proceeds in eight parts. First, we explain the genesis and role of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Second, the definition of
and what exactly constitutes a “security” is provided. Third, the securities
issuance process is discussed. Fourth, we focus our discussion on The
Division of Enforcement. Fifth, we discuss corporate governance and the
SEC. Sixth, we explore the difficult task of governing during times of rapid
technological change. Seventh, we examine contemporary issues that face
the Commission. And last, we conclude.
Keywords: blockchain, board of directors, corporate governance,
corporation finance, cybersecurity, D&O insurance, economic and risk
analysis, enforcement, environmental, social, and governance (ESG),
examinations, financial markets, FCPA, GameStop, Howey, innovation,
investment management, Koskot, registration, regulation, Robinhood,
trading and markets, United Housing, virtual currencies.
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OVERVIEW
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reports that
the “U.S. capital markets are the deepest, most dynamic, and most liquid in
the world. They also have evolved to become increasingly fast and
extraordinarily complex. It is our job to be responsive and innovative in the
face of significant market developments and trends.”1 With global markets
becoming increasingly interdependent and interconnected and, “as
technological advancements and commercial developments have changed
how our securities markets operate, our ability to remain an effective
regulator requires us to continuously monitor the market environment and,
as appropriate, adjust and modernize our expertise, rules, regulations, and
oversight tools and activities.”2 The success or failure of our society, jobs of
a global workplace, and the ability of families everywhere to feed, clothe,
and house themselves depends on the success of the SEC in providing fair
and open access to capital through efficient markets.
Our paper proceeds in eight parts. First, we explain the genesis and
role of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Second, the
definition of, and what exactly constitutes, a “security” is provided. Third,
the securities issuance process is discussed. Fourth, we focus our discussion
on The Division of Enforcement. Fifth, we discuss corporate governance
and the SEC. Sixth, we explore the difficult task of governing during times
of rapid technological change. Seventh, we examine contemporary issues
that face the Commission. And last, we conclude.
I.THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
In the autumn of 1929 the mightiest of
Americans were, for a brief time, revealed
as human beings. Like most humans, most
of the time, they did some very foolish
things… Things that in other times were
concealed by a heavy façade of dignity now
stood exposed, for the panic suddenly,

* BBA (Accounting) University of Michigan; J.D. (Banking, Corporate
Finance, and Securities Law) Howard University School of Law. Mr.
Newman is Professor of Law at Texas A&M University School of Law.
He may be contacted at nnewman@law.tamu.edu.
** BA, The American University; MBA, The George Washington
University; J.D., Oklahoma City University School of Law. Mr. Trautman
is Associate Professor of Business Law and Ethics at Prairie View A&M
University, and past-president of the New York and
Washington/Baltimore chapters of the National Association of Corporate
Directors (NACD). He may be contacted at
Lawrence.J.Trautman@gmail.com.
1
What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/5MQC-8LVR] (last modified Dec. 18, 2020).
2
Id.
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almost obscenely, snatched this façade
away…
Since 1929 we have enacted
numerous laws designed to make securities
speculation more honest and, it is hoped,
more readily restrained. None of these is a
perfect safeguard. The signal feature of the
mass escape from reality that occurred in
1929 and before ̶ and which has
characterized every previous speculative
outburst from the South Sea Bubble to the
Florida land boom ̶ was that it carried
authority with it…
The wonder, indeed, is that since
1929 we have been spared so long. One
reason, without doubt, is that the experience
of 1929 burned itself so deeply into the
national consciousness. It is worth hoping
that a history such as this will keep bright
that immunizing memory for a little longer.
John Kenneth Galbraith
Paul M. Warburg
Harvard University3
History and Role
It was The Great Crash of 1929, failure of securities markets, and
subsequent economic demise of the early 1930s that led to the need for a
Securities and Exchange Commission. Professor Galbraith writes, “Wall
Street…is of considerable importance in the American economy. The stock
market crash and the speculation which made it inevitable had an important
effect on the performance, or rather the malperformance, of the economy in
the ensuing months and years.”4 Job lost resulted, food lines and human
suffering abounded, bank failures were widespread, all hampered by the
“poor state of economic intelligence.”5
Protecting America’s Securities Markets
In the SEC’s 2020 annual report for the Division of Enforcement,
despite operating during a global pandemic, “the Commission brought 715
enforcement actions ̶ 405 of which were ‘standalone’ actions. Seventy-two
percent of these stand-alone actions included charges against one or more
individuals. The Commission also obtained more than 476 bars or
3

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929 3 (Houghton
Mifflin, 1961).
4
Id. at 2.
5
Id. at 187.
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suspensions against market participants and suspended trading in the
securities of 196 issuers.”6 To better understand the Commission’s role in
Capital markets, we learn that during FY2020, the Division of
Enforcement, “triaged approximately 23,650 tips, complaints, and referrals
and opened close to 1,200 new inquiries and investigations. Finally, the
Commission obtained judgments and orders totaling approximately $4.68
billion in disgorgement and penalties ̶ the highest amount on record.”7 We
will now explain how the SEC is organized and comment briefly on the
operations of its various divisions.
How the SEC is Organized
The SEC is organized by functional area into the divisions of:
Corporation Finance; Economic and Risk Analysis; Enforcement;
Examinations; Investment Management; and Trading and Markets. An
organization chart is presented as Exhibit 1. A brief introduction to the role
of each division is now provided.
Exhibit 1

6

U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT DIVISION OF
ENFORCEMENT, 7 (Nov. 2, 2020), https://sec.gov/enforce/reports-andpublications/annual-reports/enforcement-2020-annual-report
[https://perma.cc/E8TJ-M4EK] (last viewed Feb. 26, 2021) [hereinafter
SEC 2020 ANNUAL REPORT].
7
Id.; see also MARC I. STEINBERG, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (Oxford Univ. Press, 2018).
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Source: SEC8
Corporation Finance
The Division of Corporation Finance provides a valuable role
toward supporting “the Commission’s mission to protect investors,
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation.”9 Accordingly, “the Division… seeks to ensure that investors are
provided with material information in order to make informed investment
decisions, both when a company initially offers its securities to the public
and on an ongoing basis as it continues to give information to the
marketplace.”10 Interpretative guidance is also provided by the Division “to
companies with respect to SEC rules and forms and [the Division] makes
recommendations to the Commission regarding new rules and revisions to
existing rules.”11 For example, the Division of Corporation Finance
provides staff guidance and interpretations about: “Accounting and
Financial Reporting Guidance; [Corporate Finance] Disclosure Guidance
Topics; Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations; Dear CFO Letters and
Other Disclosure Guidance; Division Policy Statements; EDGAR Filer
Guidance; Filing Review Process; Financial Reporting Manual; No-Action,
Interpretative and Exemptive Letters; Staff Accounting Bulletins; and Staff
Legal Bulletins.”12
Economic and Risk Analysis
Elsewhere, professor Trautman discusses the appointment of
Professor Henry T.C. Hu, who served as the SEC’s inaugural Director of
the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation (2009-2011),
following the 2007-08 mortgage market meltdown and financial crisis. This
crisis brought attention to the Commission that they needed someone to
focus on the systematic risk associated with capital markets. Professor Hu
observes that:
Modern financial innovation has resulted in objective
realities that are far more complex than in the past, often
beyond the capacity of the English language, accounting
terminology, visual display, risk measurement, and other
tools on which all depictions must primarily rely.” These
same characteristics of highly sophisticated data encryption

8

SEC Employee Guide Org. Chart, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/about/secorg.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3NM-82SM]
(last modified Nov. 22, 2016).
9
Division of Corporation Finance, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/page/corpfin-section-landing
[https://perma.cc/UPL7-74DQ] (last modified Jan. 31, 2017).
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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and transmission systems apply communications systems
as well. Professor Hu further
observes that “such characteristics can be so complex that
even ‘objective reality’ is subject to multiple meanings.13
The SEC explains, “The Division of Economic and Risk Analysis
(DERA) was created in September 2009 to integrate financial economics
and rigorous data analytics into the core mission of the SEC. The Division
is involved across the entire range of SEC activities, including policymaking, rule-making, enforcement, and examination.”14
Enforcement
The Division of Enforcement according to the Commission, “was
created in August 1972 to consolidate enforcement activities that previously
had been handled by the various operating divisions at the Commission’s
headquarters in Washington… enforcement staff conducts investigations
into possible violations of the federal securities laws, and prosecutes… civil
suits in the federal counts [and brings] administrative proceedings.”15
Because of the Enforcement Division’s disproportionate importance, we
provide extensive coverage of its various activities later.16
Examinations
It is The Division of Examinations that “conducts the SEC’s
National Exam Program”17 with a stated “mission… to protect investors,
ensure market integrity and support responsible capital formation through
risk-focused strategies that: (1) improve compliance; (2) prevent fraud; (3)
monitor risk; and (4) inform policy.”18 The Division’s work product, “[the]
results of… examinations are used by the SEC to inform rule-making
initiatives, identify and monitor risks, improve industry practices and
pursue misconduct.”19
13

Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015
U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 341, 349 (2015) (citing Henry T.C. Hu, Too
Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1602, (2012) (describing the
environment of risk inherent in complex financial instruments associated
with and subsequent to the 2008–2009 global financial crisis)).
14
Economic and Risk Analysis, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/dera
[https://perma.cc/NSK3-PXJ5] (last modified Jan. 17, 2020).
15
Division of Enforcement, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/page/enforcementsection-landing [https://perma.cc/KZ9U-EXRR] (last modified Apr. 14,
2015).
16
See infra § IV.
17
Division of Examinations, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/exams
[https://perma.cc/7TYB-UBWB] (last modified Apr. 16, 2020).
18
Id.
19
Id.
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Investment Management
According to the Commission, “The Division of Investment
Management, “supports the Commission in its mission to protect investors,
maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation.”20 It is the primary responsibility of The Division to
“administ[er] the Investment Company Act of 1940 and Investment
Advisors Act of 1940, which includes developing regulatory policy for
investment companies (e.g., mutual funds, including money market funds,
closed-end funds, business development companies, unit investment trusts,
variable insurance products, and exchange-traded funds) and for investment
advisers.”21
Trading and Markets
In brief, The Division of Trading and Markets at the SEC,
“establishes and maintains standards for fair, orderly, and efficient markets.
The Division regulates the major securities market participants, including
broker-dealers, self-regulatory organizations (such as stock exchanges,
FINRA, and clearing agencies), and transfer agents.”22
Organization By Office & Regional Branches
For purposes of efficiency, much of the specialized work of the
SEC is conducted within its various Offices and regional branches. The
Regional Offices are located in: Atlanta; Boston; Chicago; Denver; Fort
Worth; Los Angeles; Miami; New York; Philadelphia; Salt Lake City; and
San Francisco.23 These specialized SEC “offices” include:
the EDGAR business Office; Office of Acquisitions; Office
of Administrative Law Judges; Office of the Advocate for
Small Business Capital Formation; Office of the Chief
Accountant; Office of the Chief Operating Officer; Office of
the Chief Risk Officer; Office of Credit Ratings; Office of
Equal Employment Opportunity; Office of Ethics Counsel;
Office of Financial Management; Office of the General
Counsel; Office of Human Resources; Office of Information
Technology; Office of Inspector General; Office of
International Affairs; Office of the Investor Advocate;
Office of the Investor Education and Advocacy; Office of
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs; Office of
Minority and Women Inclusion; Office of Municipal
20

Division of Investment Management, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/investment-management [https://perma.cc/J4EPXYLJ] (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
21
Id.
22
Trading and Markets, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/tradingmarkets [https://perma.cc/8G36-Q5BP] (last modified Oct. 1, 2020).
23
SEC Regional Offices, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/page/sec-regionaloffices [https://perma.cc/V9BW-MRWP] (last modified Aug. 11, 2016).
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Securities; Office of Public Affairs; Office of the Secretary;
and Office of Support Operations…24
SEC As Information Source
The SEC website, www.sec.gov, provides a robust source of
information for: investors; accounting and legal practitioners; those seeking
business, industry and competitive intelligence; and the general public. For
example, a recent highly controversial issue, as reflected by Congressional
hearings, is the privacy issue of user’s personal information held by widely
used technology giants such as Facebook or Google.
II.WHAT IS A SECURITY
When addressing the question, “What is a Security?” – A corollary
question is, “Why should we care?” – The threshold question of whether or
not a transaction is a security is important because the implications are far
reaching. Crossing the securities definitional trip wire has a rippling effect.
Once the determination is made that the transaction in question is in fact a
security, then the transaction now comes under the purview of all applicable
federal and state securities laws; a mine field of compliance obligations and
culpable activity for the unenlightened or the unaware.
Once the parties find themselves in the securities law space they
must now be mindful that they are, at all times, remaining compliant with
all applicable federal and state securities laws. These requirements include
issues such as when and how to disclose pertinent financial and business
information regarding the issuer, when the securities must be registered,
and a host of other compliance issues. Thus, the threshold question is an
important one. If it turns out that the transaction in question is not a
security, then the parties don’t have to worry about securities law
compliance, although other rules may apply.
The “Howey” Test
The volume of rules, regulations, acts, and statutes that comprise
the securities law’s regulatory regime are voluminous. Practitioners and
scholars alike will digest a fraction of what is out there even after decades
of practice. As in most areas of the law, the key to resolving any securities
related issue is knowing where to look given the issue at hand. Determining
whether or not a certain transaction is a security is no exception.
The Starting Point
The Securities Act of 1933 (“’33 Act”) is the starting point; born
primarily due to the Great Depression of 1929, although there have been

24

SEC Divisions Homepages, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/divisions.shtml
[https://perma.cc/25FP-S358] (last visited Dec. 17, 2020).
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some amendments since that time.25 The ’33 Act remains close to the
original version that was penned back in 1933. The ’33 Act, is the first
reference point when dealing with transactional matters such as issuing
securities either publicly or privately. The ’33 Act is also the reference
point when grappling with the question “What is a Security?”
The ’33 Act’s Section 2. a.1
The ’33 Act’s Section 2 – (Definitions; Promotions of Efficiency,
Competition, and Capital Formation) is the section that houses a number of
’33 Act definitions.26 Up front and the very first item identified—thus
signifying its importance—is the definition of a security. Section 2.a.1.
reads as follows:
(a) DEFINITIONS - When used in this subchapter, unless the
context otherwise requires—
(1) The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury
stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateraltrust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable
share,
investment
contract,
votingtrust certificate,
certificate
of
deposit
for
a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on
any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of
securities (including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to
foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate
25

The 1933 Securities Act was the first major federal securities law
passed following the stock market crash of 1929. The law is also referred
to as the Truth in Securities Act, the Federal Securities Act, or the 1933
Act. It was enacted on May 27, 1933 during the Great Depression.
(President Roosevelt stated that the law was aimed at correcting some of
the wrongdoings that led to the exploitation of the public). The
wrongdoings included insider trading, the sale of fraudulent securities,
secretive and manipulative trading to drive up share prices, and other acts
that some financial institutions and professional stock traders engaged in,
to the disadvantage of ordinary individual investors. See The 1933
Securities Act—“The Truth in Securities Act”,
CORPORATEFINANCEINSTITUTE.COM (2021),
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/tradinginvesting/1933-securities-act-truth-securities/ [https://perma.cc/NSA55M7L].
26
See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1)–(19), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2021).
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for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing.27
True to form and endemic throughout the ’33 Act’s language, the
Act tends to define things broadly and leaves ultimate interpretation to rule
making provisions promulgated through the Securities and Exchange
Commission as well as through case law. Turning back to the question of
“what is a Security?” and appreciating how the above definition fits into
that analysis - as the definition portends, there are a number of
“instruments” that may fall under the definition of a security. As a practical
matter and in practice, the courts have narrowed the approach down to
some finite analytical tools to answer the question as to whether or not any
particular transaction constitutes a securities transaction.
The “Howey” Test –
When addressing whether or not a certain transaction constitutes a
stock transaction, the analytical approach distills as follows. For
conventional stock shares, no test is required. Ownership shares in
companies such as Wal-Mart or Home Depot are your “Garden Variety”
stock transactions that require no further analytical assessing to determine
their nature or character.28 But transactions off the beaten path are the ones
that prompted the analytical approach first penned in a United States
Supreme Court case decided in 1946 and is still in effect today.29
The Investment Contract
Typically, those stock transactions that fall outside the conventional
Walmart or Home Depot shares alluded to earlier are analyzed under the
’33 Act’s Section 2(a)(1) as an Investment Contract.30 As is the case with
many matters found in the ’33 Act, an Investment Contract is not
specifically defined. SEC vs. W.J. Howey Co. is the case where the court
marked the definitional contours of an Investment Contract and therefore a
securities transaction.31
The Howey case involved a citrus grove company called the W.J.
Howey Company.32 The W.J. Howey Company sold units of citrus groves
27

Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2021).
See Walmart, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), p. 56 (Mar. 19, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0000104169/00001041
6921000033/wmt20210131.htm#iaaf0cabf1f7048c9b7e317b3e9c1cfc5_115
[https://perma.cc/F94Z-96BP]; see also The Home Depot Inc., Annual
Report (10-K), p.39 (Mar. 24, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0000354950/00003549
5021000089/hd-20210131.htm#i767754147c274b8fbbfeb5ffedb7558f_43
[https://perma.cc/7M7S-XGHM].
29
See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
30
Securities Act, supra note 26.
31
See W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 298–99.
32
Id. at 294.
28
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to anyone wishing to and having an interest to buy into the endeavor.33 The
investor had the option of hiring a management company to cultivate the
groves and make them ready for sale.34 Alternatively, and what was
typically the case, the W.J. Howey Company also had a management
company available, the Howey in the Hills Company who would, for an
additional fee, cultivate the purchase of orange groves and make the groves
ready for sale.35 Though it was not clear from the case how the dispute
arose, the key question that the case addressed was whether the nature of
the transactions in question constituted securities transactions.36 The
Court’s answer to that question was ultimately “yes.”37
The “Howey” Test Applied
The Court in Howey analyzed the nature of these transactions,
focusing on their economic substance.38 The Court looked at the
relationship between those that were purchasing tracts of citrus groves and
the company from whom such purchases were being made. It was the
asymmetrical nature of the relationship between the W.J. Howey Company
and the investors that factored significantly in the Court’s decision.39 In its
opinion, the Court recognized that the transactions in question were 1)
investments of money; 2) in a common enterprise; 3) with investors
expecting or being led to expect profits; 4) whose profits would be derived
solely from the efforts of others –(versus the investor’s efforts
themselves).40 In the Court’s assessment, when all four of these elements
are present, then the transaction in question will meet the legal definition of
an Investment Contract and therefore meet the legal definition of a
security.41 These four elements comprise what are referred to, to this day, as
the Howey test.
The Focus on Economic Substance
As alluded to earlier, key in understanding the Howey test’s
underpinnings is the test’s focus on a transaction’s economic substance.42
The transactions as described in Howey were ones where you had one
group, the “investors”, entrusting their money to another, the company, and
relying on that company’s efforts to take the investor’s money and use that
33

See id. at 295.
Id. at 296.
35
Id. at 295.
36
See id. at 294.
37
Id. at 300.
38
See id. at 298.
39
See id. at 299–300 (the Court noting that the Howey Company offered
this opportunity to persons who reside “in distant localities and who lack
the equipment and experience requisite to the cultivation, harvesting, and
marketing of the citrus products. Such persons have no desire to occupy
the land or to develop it themselves; they are attracted solely by the
prospects of a return on their investment”).
40
See id. at 298–99.
41
Id.
42
See id. at 298.
34
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money for what the investor hopes is a profitable endeavor that will
generate a return on that money.43 Therefore, in substance, these
transactions are similar to owning shares in a Home Depot. For example, as
a Home Depot shareholder, one’s expectation for buying Home Depot
shares is that the company will work to be profitable and the share’s value
will appreciate. The investor is not expected nor required to go work at a
Home Depot to help Home Depot become more profitable – perhaps
directing patrons to the plumbing or lumber sections. Any appreciation in
Home Depot’s share value is derived solely from Home Depot’s efforts
exclusively. The investor can shop at Lowe’s – (though that would be
against the investor’s financial interest) and never step foot inside a Home
Depot store but nonetheless will realize an increase on his investment if the
value of Home Depot’s shares increase.
Thus, when analyzing any transaction using the Howey test, it is
important to keep the test’s focus on economic substance in mind. The
“economic substance” is that situation where one party entrusts their money
to another, and the latter takes and uses that money to grow the venture.
Appreciating the nature of this asymmetric relationship helps in guiding the
analysis and determining whether a particular transaction would be
considered a security.
United Housing – When “Stock” is Not a Security – Focus on
Economic Substance
Illustrating the principle that courts will focus on the economic
substance of transactions versus merely acquiescing to a transaction’s labels
is the case of United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman.44 Here again the
Court was tasked to determine whether the transactions in question
constituted securities transactions. In this case, the Court concluded that
these were not securities transactions.45
United Housing involved a co-op housing complex that was selling
“stock shares” in exchange for leasing space in one of the co-op’s housing
units. In the course of their tenancy, the plaintiff’s alleged that the housing
co-op neglected to disclose annual rent increases.46 The plaintiff’s alleged
that because their interests in the housing co-op was evidenced by
purchasing shares of stock, that the interests in question were securities
transactions.47
The Court, however, disagreed with the plaintiff’s
characterization.48 Instead, in spite of the co-op interests being referred to as
“stock” shares, the Court focused on the transaction’s economic substance
43

See id. at 299.
United Hous. Found., Inc., v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 839.
48
Id. at 848.
44
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and found that the interests in the housing units were NOT securities
transactions.49 In arriving at its conclusions, the court focused on the
economic substance of these so called “shares.” The court’s analysis
revolved around comparing these so called “stock shares” to the typical
characteristics found in a share of stock.50 In that regard the court noted that
the United Housing “shares of stock” did not have any of the typical
characteristics found in a share of stock – namely the payment of dividends,
the appreciation in value, or the exercise of voting rights - the
characteristics commensurate with typical shares of stock.51 When distilled
down to its essence, all that came with the ownership in the co-op’s
“shares” of stock was the right to occupy a specified unit in the housing’s
co-op. In substance, this ownership – in spite of being referred to as “shares
of stock,” were not deemed to be securities transactions. The focus on these
transactions’ economic substance is what guided the analysis regardless of
how the transactions were referred to in form.
Koskot – Ponzi Schemes – the “Common Enterprise” and Efforts of
Others
As will always be the case, the outer limits of a law’s reach is going
to be tested as the creative minds of the nefarious are often at work. Those
that wish to skirt the securities law’s long reach will be thoughtful in how
they structure their transactions in attempts not to come within the purview
of the securities law’s regulatory regime.52 Conversely, the Securities and
Exchange Commission will advocate for broad and expansive
interpretations to reach transactions where investors are or are potentially
being exploited. One such case that illustrates this idea is SEC v. Koskot
Interplanetary.53
Koskot put at issue the outer limits of the Howey Test’s third
element, which is the requirement that the profits from the enterprise be
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derived “solely from the efforts of others.54” The narrow inquiry in Koskot
was the question of whether this element is still satisfied when the investors
in question, instead of being completely passive, do in fact take some role
in the enterprise’s profit-making endeavors. Called into question was to
what extent could the investors be involved in the enterprise and still be
able to maintain the transaction’s legal status as a securities transaction.55
Koskot involved the now familiar business model of multi-level
marketing schemes where the goal is to recruit others to join the enterprise
and likewise purchase, use and or sell the enterprise’s products.56 Koskot
would recruit new members via a tightly scripted and orchestrated approach
referred to as the “curiosity approach”57 – a method often deployed in
multilevel marketing enterprises. Current members attempt to recruit new
members by approaching friends, colleagues, even strangers and telling
them they have a business opportunity that they might find interesting. But
they don’t tell the prospect what the opportunity is.58 The prospect shows
up at the designated meeting spot, usually a member’s home or some rented
space for larger meeting, and in a tightly scripted fashion the meeting
commences with the meeting’s sole purpose being to convince prospects to
join the enterprise so that they likewise will use the products, sell the
products, and will recruit more members themselves to do the same.59
Earlier members get credit for recruiting later members. Earlier members
also get credit for the products and services that members of their “down
line” both use and sell.60
Were the Transactions in Question Securities?
Here, in Koskot, the securities question revolved around the Howey
test’s third element – that element being that the profits must be derived
“solely” from the efforts of others. The issue here and the dilemma that the
Court’s wrestled with was the fact that those seeking to be deemed
investors, i.e. Koskot’s members, were also actively involved with meeting,
and recruiting new members.61 Also, the members were the ones who
hosted the recruiting meetings to which the prospects were invited.62 Again,
these meetings were tightly scripted – the goal of which was to show
outward trappings of wealth and success.63 The meeting might involve a
54
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very high up member in the Koskot organization showing up at the meeting
in a nice new car. Cadillacs were the suggested car of choice to show the
outward trappings of wealth and success.64 The meeting’s whole tone and
tenor would be to get prospects excited about the opportunity to likewise
achieve similar levels of wealth and success.65
Because the members did take an active role in recruiting new
members, the court had to wrestle with how such member involvement
reconciled with the element that profits were to be derived solely from the
efforts of others. Here, the members clearly had some involvement with the
endeavor. Hosting these meetings were integral to the enterprise’s success.
So – what impact did these member’s involvement have on the Howey
test’s third element? The element speaking to the fact that profits were to be
derived “solely” from the efforts of others.
The Court resolved this dilemma by expanding how the third
element was to be interpreted and applied. In its reasoning, the Court stated,
“contrary to the view of the district court, we need not feel
compelled to follow the ‘solely from the efforts of others’ test literally.
Nowhere in the opinion does the Supreme Court characterize the nature of
the ‘efforts’ that would render a promotional scheme beyond the pale of the
definition of an investment contract. . .”66 The Court sought to minimize the
role that the scripted meetings played in the Koskot enterprise by reasoning
that such a role was not the type of “effort” that should negate the finding
of a securities transaction. The Court narrowed what constituted effort to
those “undeniably significant” efforts; those efforts that were managerial in
nature.67 Because the recruiting meetings were tightly scripted and didn’t
involve any strategic thought, planning, analysis, etc., the Court concluded
that the investor’s roles in hosting the meetings were merely “ministerial”
and therefore should not be deemed as significant enough to negate the
Howey Test’s third element.68 Accordingly, the Court found the Koskot
multi-level marketing scheme to be a security.69
The Takeaway
The takeaway from the Koskot case is an appreciation for how
courts grapple with securities law issues. Courts will flex toward broader
interpretations rather than narrow ones. Findings will often be based on the
economic substance.70 Here, in Koskot’s case it is reasonable to conclude
that the Court had issues with how new members were lured into the
Koskot organization. The promise of riches, the tightly scripted meeting
process, and the intentional displays of wealth; all were designed to
64
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manipulate the prospects into joining the Koskot enterprise. Though not
explicitly stated in the opinion, one could conclude that Koskot’s
manipulative recruiting tactics played into the Court’s findings. Note in the
Court’s final comments, “we merely endorse a test which is resilient
enough to encompass the egregious promotional scheme purveyed by
Koskot.”71 Again, the asymmetrical nature of the relationship versus two
sides being on equal footing. The Court took an expansive view in this case,
but it did so to get at a scheme that the Court likely felt was taking
advantage of people and preying on their susceptibility to the promises of
wealth and riches.72
III.THE SECURITIES ISSUANCE PROCESS
History demonstrates that dorm rooms have been the birthplace of
several of the world’s largest businesses: Mark Zuckerberg and several
classmates founded Facebook while at Harvard;73 Google’s creation by
Larry Page and Sergey Brin while at Stanford;74 Michael Dell’s start-up of
Dell Computer resulted from selling computers from his dorm room while a
student at the University of Texas in Austin;75 Uber, Airbnb, and others76
are recent examples of very successful businesses that have experienced
profound periods of growth. Sooner or later, every highly successful startup company will need additional capital to finance their growth. These
companies create the jobs that enable large populations to feed, house, and
clothe their children. The taxes generated from these businesses finance
public education, healthcare, and other necessary services provided by
governmental institutions. We will now explore some of the legal
requirements involved with raising capital.
Registration Process
An initial public offering (IPO) is the process by which a company
offers the company’s stock shares to the public. Administratively, the IPO
process involves a company completing what is referred to as a Registration
Statement.77 The company files the Registration Statement with the
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Securities and Exchange Commission.78 The Registration Statement
contains a penumbra of required information about the company’s business,
finances, operations, and management.79 Staff at the Securities and
Exchange Commission review the Registration Statement.80 Once they are
satisfied that the Registration Statement contains all the necessary
disclosures, it declares the Registration Statement effective which then
allows the issuer to offer its shares to the public.81 This section takes a look
at various aspects of this public offering process. The decision to take a
company public is a seminal event in any company’s life. For companies
that consider this move carefully, the registration process has many layers
to it.
The Business Decision
Before the first words of a Registration statement are drafted, those
companies that are thoughtful about the process will first go through much
internal assessment to determine whether going public is the right decision
for them as the implications of doing so are far reaching.82 Companies that
are circumspect will go through a deliberative process that considers what
things will look like once they are on the other side of the public offering
and are operating as a publicly traded company.83 And then they will work
backwards and see what needs to happen administratively, logistically,
operationally, etc., to get their company ready to go through the public
offering process and operate as a publicly traded company.84 The decision
making process in taking a company public is a paper topic unto itself.
Here, some of the high-level aspects involved are touched upon.
Public vs. Private – Everyone Literally in Your Business Now
The first and perhaps the most invasive aspect of going public is the
disclosure regime under which the company will be operating once the
company becomes publicly owned. The process of going public along with
operating on an ongoing basis as a publicly traded company means that the
company is now required to open up and share its inner workings and lay
bare for all the public to examine, critique, scrutinize, etc.85 This disclosure
regime is a cost of doing business. Part of the cost of gaining access to the
public markets and the billions of dollars that can be accessed there is
disclosing all the material financial and business aspects of your company
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on an ongoing basis.86 Companies are legally required to tell the investing
public “the good the bad and the ugly” regarding their company – warts and
all. This disclosure regime can take some getting used to. For some
companies it can be a real challenge; especially with the initial public
offering where the issuer has its first experience with disclosing the inner
workings of its operations to the public. Part of the disclosure regime
requires disclosing to the public all the bad things that could happen to the
issuer. The SEC’s disclosure regime has a specific section in the
Registration Statement for this which is referred to as the “Risk Factors.”87
Item 105 of Regulation S-K is the section that lays out the disclosure
requirements for Risk Factors. With respect to this section, the disclosure
requirements state, “Where appropriate, provide under the caption ‘Risk
Factors’ a discussion of the material factors that make an investment in the.
. .offering speculative or risky. . .Do not present risks that could apply to
any issuer or any offering. Explain how the risk affects the issuer or the
securities being offered. . .”88
The SEC’s disclosure regime requires the issuing company to
understand and appreciate that it will be opening its doors, drawers, and
closets to the public for scrutiny, examination, and criticism. Management
needs to have a full understanding and appreciation for this invasive part of
the process that is ongoing and unyielding.
Getting the Corporate House in Order
From a corporate governance standpoint, operating as a publicly
traded company versus a privately held one is different as well. The issuing
company has to make sure that it is situated both legally and
organizationally to operate as a publicly traded company. From a legal
standpoint, the company more than likely will have to reconsider its capital
structure. If the company’s capital raising path has been like many, then
prior to seeking access to the public markets, the company may have
undergone a number of financing options such as private offerings to
friends and family, offerings to what are referred to as “Angel Investors”,
and possibly even a number of offering rounds to venture capitalists.89
86
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Assuming this is the case, then the company must make sure that it
restructures its capital prior to undertaking the public offering process.90
Often times, private offerings don’t involve the common stock that
is typically used in public offerings.91 But the stock issued to these private
investors may have been various forms of preferred stock.92 Preferred stock
is any stock that has a characteristic or feature that gives the preferred stock
holder a right, preference, or privilege that is superior to the rights,
preferences, or privileges ascribed to the common shares.93 For example,
the preferred stock holders in a given company may have what is referred to
as a “liquidation preference.”94 A liquidation preference is a stock
preference that gives the Preferred Shareholder some type of superior right
to the common shareholders in the event that the company decides to
liquidate;95 i.e. sell all of its assets by converting those assets to cash and
then splitting up the proceeds amongst its shareholders.96 Preferred stock
with a liquidation preference might have the right to receive say $1,000 per
share of those liquidated assets before the common shareholders receive
anything.97 Accordingly, addressing the aspect of preferred stock holders is
important, since any contractual rights that these preferred shareholders
have may be disruptive to the public offering process if those contractual
rights aren’t properly addressed.
Fortunately, venture capitalists are invariably in the venture capital
business to realize profitable returns on their investments. Taking a
company public is one of the most profitable ways that preferred
shareholders can realize a return on their investment. Accordingly, along
with whatever rights, preferences, and privileges that may have been
ascribed to a share of preferred stock, those preferred shareholders will
likely receive such contractual rights as the right to convert their preferred
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shares into common shares in the event the company goes public.98
Alternatively, the preferred shares may be offered registration rights which
would give the preferred shareholder the contractual right of having their
preferred shares registered and included in the public offering.99 Again, a
thoughtful company will issue preferred shares, at least considering the
prospect that the company may do a public offering at some point down the
road and will take that contingency into consideration by providing for
contractual provisions ascribed to the preferred shares that call for
conversion and or registration rights.
Structuring the Public Offering
Other implications involved in a company offering its shares to the
public is the matter of control. Understand that each share of common stock
issued to the public represents a sliver of company ownership. The more
shares issued to the public, the greater the proportion of that company being
owned by public shareholders. Again, a thoughtful public offering involves
the company planning for this contingency. One thing to appreciate about
the state corporate codes that reside in our fifty state jurisdictions is that
these corporate codes allow for flexibility, creativity, and innovation which
is limited only by the imaginations of its crafters. In the events leading up
to a public offering, the company will restructure its capital to make sure
that some things remain intact even after the company goes public.100 For
example, the company may want to ensure ultimate company ownership
and control remains vested in a finite number of shareholders; perhaps the
founding shareholders or the shareholders who invested in the company in
98
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the early stages.101 To achieve such a result, the company may amend its
charter – thereby creating different classes of stock – each with varied
voting rights.102 “Class A Common” for example may be created and issued
to a select number of founders. These shares could be given a stock right of
ten votes per share whereas the common shares offered to the public would
only have one vote per share. This tiered approach was the capital structure
that United Parcel Service set up as a pre-cursor to its initial public offering
occurring back in 1999.103 By creating alternate classes of stock with varied
voting rights, UPS’s founding shareholders were able to access the public
markets while still maintaining operational and voting control over the
company by issuing tiered classes of stock with varied voting rights. All of
these steps are legal. The only caveat being that the company must disclose
these machinations in its offering documents so that the investing public is
aware of what they are getting – (and not getting) by virtue of their
investment in the company.104
The “Gun Jumping” Rules of Section 5
The premise upon which the securities laws are built are to protect
investors through timely and appropriate disclosure as it relates to issuing,
selling, buying, or exchange of securities. The idea is that investors or
potential investors are making informed decisions about the companies in
which they are investing. This disclosure regime is robust in the context of
a company offering its shares publicly for the first time – (i.e. the initial
public offering).
The ’33 Act’s Section 5
The ’33 Act’s Section 5 is perhaps the Act’s most analytically
challenging section. Reading and properly interpreting Section 5 requires an
appreciation for the ’33 Act’s idiosyncratic and layered nature. Such
drafting was intentional on the part of its authors who penned the Act’s first
versions back in 1933.105
Reading and parsing through the ’33 Act’s Section 5 is a rigorous
endeavor. Once dissected however, its mandates are fairly straightforward.
Again, in keeping with this recurring theme of required disclosure as the
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pre-cursor to offering, buying, or selling securities, Section 5 carries that
theme and requires as follows:
Section 5 delineates into three discrete time periods in relation to
the timing of a public offering: the pre-filing period, the waiting period, and
the post-effective period.106
1. The Pre-filing Period: The first defining period that implicates
Section 5’s mandates is the pre-filing period. This is the period leading up
to but prior to a company filing its registration statement.107 During the prefiling period, the company is prohibited from both offering to sell and
selling its securities.108 Again, the idea here is that the SEC does not want
companies percolating the prospect of buying into some new venture
without the investing public having the benefit of and access to a vetted
document that has the prescribed business and financial disclosures
regarding the company. So, companies are prohibited from making any
offers to the public prior to filing their registration statement with the
SEC.109
The ’33 Act’s Hidden Traps
Although this prohibition seems clear enough, the challenge comes
in understanding the ’33 Act’s definitional traps. As alluded to earlier in
this writing, securities law concepts tend to be interpreted both liberally and
broadly.110 The ’33 Act’s reach is expansive when applying or interpreting
its provisions. Section 5 is no exception. A key aspect regarding the
prohibition against a company “offering” to sell its securities before a
registration statement is filed is the ’33 Act’s broad definition ascribed to an
“offer.” Section 5 takes what we might have understood to be a typical offer
and takes it to another level. The ’33 Act defines an offer as, “. . . every
attempt to offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy a security or
interest in a security for value . . . .”111 This broad definition puts companies
in a precarious position when it starts to consider the proposition of taking
its shares public. In addition to all the internal housekeeping matters
discussed earlier, in the run up to offering its securities for sale, the
company must also now be aware and sensitive to its “outward
manifestations” to the public.
The use of the term “outward manifestations” is intentional to stress
the fact that the SEC interprets the idea of an “offer” broadly and therefore
a company should take care not to trip that wire as the consequences for
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doing so can be dire.112 One of the main consequences of running afoul of
the SEC’s “gun jumping” rules is that the SEC has the power and the
discretion of delaying the effective date of a company’s registration
statement which has the intended effect of delaying the date on which a
company can sell its shares to the public.113 For some companies, going
public is time sensitive, where the missed window may scuttle the whole
endeavor. For others, it may be a minor inconvenience. All things being
equal, given the stakes involved and the millions of dollars in play,
companies are well advised to operate within Section 5’s gun jumping
confines. Accordingly, offers to sell securities or selling the company’s
securities are prohibited during the pre-filing period.114
2. The Waiting Period – The waiting period is the period after the
company has filed the registration statement and is now waiting for the SEC
to declare the registration statement effective.115 Understand, the company
now has a draft of its registration statement on file with the SEC. A draft of
a document that provides information regarding the company such as
historical profit and loss information, information about the business and its
operations, information about the company’s management, and of course
those vaunted “risk factors” alluded to earlier.116 With this information
regarding the company prepared and on file with the SEC, the company can
now make offers. But again, the manner in which a company can make
these offers is regulated and restricted. The company is limited to making
oral offers, and any written offers must be accompanied by the SEC
compliant prospectus that is a part of the materials filed in the registration
statement.117 Understand that the company prepared this information
pursuant to a specific set of rules and regulations that mandates with some
specificity the information that must comprise the registration statement’s
contents.118
Again, the idea is to control the information being disseminated to
potential investors.119 The SEC wants to be sure that information is
complete, thorough, and accurate within material limits. The information
contained in the SEC compliant prospectus is the information that the SEC
wants investors to have access to prior to making their decision to invest.120
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Accordingly, all offers made during the waiting period must be
accompanied or preceded by an SEC compliant prospectus.121
It is very important to note although companies may make offers to
buy their securities, during the waiting period, companies are nonetheless
prohibited from making sales during the waiting period.122 “Sales” cannot
occur until the SEC declares the registration statement effective.123 During
the waiting period, issuing companies get what are referred to as
“indications of interest.”124 With these “indications of interest” – the
company, through its underwriters, will approach a potential investor.125
Investors tend to be high net worth individuals such as a Jerry Jones or an
Oprah Winfrey, or institutional investors such as mutual fund companies,
pension fund companies, or insurance companies looking to diversify their
portfolios.126 If a potential investor wants to participate in the IPO, the
investor will respond with, “Put me down for X shares.”127 This is the
investor indicating his interest. Mind you, although this is not a contractual
obligation per se, an investor’s failure to follow through on their “indication
of interest” usually results in not being approached the next time an IPO
comes available. Also, word travels fast in these circles which could mean
that this potential investor may not receive calls down the road from
underwriters regarding future or pending IPOs.
Again, the idea behind these prohibitions is investor protection.
Presumably, when a registration statement is filed, it is an unfinished
document. The waiting period is the time where the SEC’s Division of
Corporate Finance reviews that registration statement against the SEC’s
disclosure mandates to ensure that the company has disclosed all the
information that the company is required to disclose and done so in
accordance with the SEC’s mandates.128 This review function is typically
performed by an SEC staff attorney who works within the Division of
Corporate Finance. That person could easily be someone one or two years
out of law school, or it could be a former law firm partner who has grown
tired of the 2,000 annual billable hour requirement and is seeking the more
normal hours that comes with working for the federal government.129
121

Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(1)–(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e. Sales are
restricted until the SEC declares the registration statement effective.
123
Id.
124
Investor Bulletin: Investing in an IPO, supra note 100.
125
E.g., PALMITER, supra note 106, at 162.
126
Investor Bulletin: Investing in an IPO, supra note 100.
127
Id.
128
Id. Specifically, refer to the section titled “What is an IPO.”
129
Here, the author is drawing upon his own experience with the SEC.
Though dated, during the summer of 1996, the author interned at the
SEC’s office in Washington D.C. and met first hand, former law firm
partners who expressed their preference for working at the SEC in part
due to the more regular work hours. The author also met Staff Attorneys
122
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In any event, this SEC staff attorney will review the registration
statement’s prospectus and will write comment letters on that registration
statement.130 These comment letters are simply things that the examiner has
noted as needing more disclosure, more detail, more clarification, etc. The
exchange of comment letters can go back and forth between the SEC and
the company a number of times before all comments are cleared.131 Once
the SEC is satisfied with the registration statement’s contents, then the SEC
will declare the registration statement effective and the company now can
consummate all the “indications of interest” that it collected during the
waiting period.132
3. The Post Effective Period – The point after which the SEC
declares the registration statement “effective” marks the Post Effective
Period. The company can now both offer and sell its securities.133
Additionally, all the “indications of interest” the company recorded during
the waiting period can now be finalized with the investors forwarding
payment in exchange for shares.134 SEC protocols are still in effect,
however. The rules require that prior to any sales transaction being
completed, the consummation of the sales process again must be preceded
by or accompany the now effective registration statement.135 The recurring
refrain here being that the investor’s decision is an informed one. Over the
years, the SEC has made compliance with this mandate much easier.136
With technology now making information readily accessible, the SEC has
deemed this requirement as being met once the registration statement has
been declared effective.137 The SEC has a database referred to as
Electronica Data Gather Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR). All public
filings are stored in the SEC’s EDGAR database and can be accessed by
anyone having access to a computer and an internet connection.138 Because
who worked in the same division who were either recent graduates or
were fairly new attorneys who had made a move to the SEC early in their
careers.
130
Investor Bulletin: Investing in an IPO, INVESTOR.GOV (Feb. 25, 2013),
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/general-resources/newsalerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletins-17 [https://perma.cc/4MLBPWSN].
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
134
Investor Bulletin: Investing in an IPO, supra note 100.
135
Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
136
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.172(b) (2021). In 2005, the SEC passed a number
of reforms that eased some of the regulatory burden on issuers. One of
those lightened regulatory burdens was the requirement that investors
receive a prospectus prior to consummating a securities sale. The SEC
implemented the “Access Equals Delivery” protocol which is codified in
Securities Act Rule 172b.
137
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.172(b) (2021).
138
The EDGAR database can be accessed through SEC.gov.
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of this accessibility, once the SEC declares the registration statement
effective and that effective registration statement is available on the SEC’s
EDGAR system that is all that is required to meet the post effective period
protocols.139
This writing provides a distilled version as to how the SEC’s gun
jumping rules work. Again, Section 5’s underlying premise is intuitive and
straightforward. But the traps for the unenlightened stem from the SEC’s
broad definitions as to what constitutes an offer. Taking heed to these
definitional traps and staying within its boundaries is what is key to keeping
a company from running afoul of the SEC’s gun jumping rules.
Exempt Transactions
The large majority of businesses out there are too small and don’t
have a need to go through a full blown time intensive expensive registered
offering process.140 But these businesses nonetheless need capital to operate
with issuing stock being one of the most effective ways to get access to that
needed capital.141 Thus enters what is referred to as the private exemption,
or private offering. A maxim in the securities world and one that is
important to remember is – “Any time securities are bought or sold, those
securities must either be registered or be bought or sold under an applicable
exemption.”142 This general rule is important to understand the practices
that occur with companies and their quest at raising capital through issuing
stock. As mentioned earlier, raising capital through a registered offering is
not a viable option for most companies. Thus, the private offering is the
backstop and the means by which smaller companies gain access to much
needed capital.143
The Private Offering Regime
The private offering regulatory regime is complicated. This is an
understatement. Here the attempt is made to give a working overview of
how this space works. The best way to understand how the private offering
regime works is to understand the underlying rationale for the SEC
139

17 C.F.R. § 230.172(b) (2021).
See SEC Harmonizes and Improves “Patchwork” Exempt Offering
Framework, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 2, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-273 [https://perma.cc/8V227HWM]. “The registration process generally is designed for larger
companies with substantial resources. As a result, many entrepreneurs and
emerging businesses raise capital by selling securities in reliance on an
offering exemption . . . .”
141
See id.
142
See id. “A core component of our federal regulatory regime is the
requirement that all securities offerings be registered with the Commission
or qualify for an exemption from registration . . . .”
143
See id. “The registration process generally is designed for larger
companies with substantial resources. As a result, many entrepreneurs and
emerging businesses raise capital by selling securities in reliance on an
offering exemption . . . .”
140
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allowing for situations where companies can offer securities without having
to register them in the first place. The underlying rationale from the SEC’s
point in those situations where the risk of investors being harmed is not
high, the SEC is not going to task a company to go through the time
consuming and expensive process of requiring the company to register its
securities prior to offering them.144
Accordingly, when the risk of investor harm is low, or the risk of
investor exposure is low, the SEC will allow companies to issue its stock
without having to register them. It is helpful to keep these underlying
principles in mind as the various exemptions are discussed.
The Common Private Offering Exemptions
The “Reg. D” Exemption - Offerings to High Net Worth or High
Net Income
Individuals–
From a statistical stand point, the most commonly used private
exemptions are the ones that fall under what is referred to as Regulation
D.145 Regulation D consists of Rules 500–508.146 Nested within those rules
are voluminous amounts of information laying out how the Regulation D
exemptions work. The most common Regulation D exemption is the one
that falls under Regulation D’s Rule 506(b).147 This exemption provision
allows companies to issue securities without having to register those
securities if the investors in question are either accredited or the investor,
“has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that
he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment, or the issuer reasonably believes immediately prior to making
any sale that such purchaser comes within this description.”148 Regulation
D’s Rule 501 provides the definition for accredited investors which
includes the following:
a.
Any natural person who had individual
income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two
144

See id. “For many small and medium-sized business, our exempt
offering framework is the only viable channel for raising capital.”
145
15 U.S.C. § 77(d).
146
Id.
147
Id. Regulation D: According to SEC data, there were over 15,500
initial Regulation D filings for up to $5 million in fiscal years 2010 and
2011. In comparison, there were 8 qualified initial Regulation A offerings
during this period. According to a recent report prepared for SEC, the
median Regulation D offering was $1 million from January 2009 through
March 2011 and the overwhelming majority of Regulation D issuers have
been issuing securities under Rule 506.20. See also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: FACTORS
THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012).
148
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2021).
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most recent years or joint income with that person’s
spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years
and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the
same income level in the current year.149
b.
Any natural person whose individual net
worth or joint net worth with that person’s spouse,
at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000.150
c.
Any director, executive officer, or general
partner of the issuer of the securities being offered
or sold, or any director, executive officer, or general
partner of that issuer.151
There are additional accredited investor definitions related to
entities as opposed to individuals.152 The ones noted above are the ones
most relied upon when dealing with individuals and their accredited
investor status. Those persons who are not accredited but nonetheless are
considered “financially sophisticated” are referred to as “purchasers.”153
Offerings under Rule 506(b) are limited to no more than 35 of these
purchasers.154 The number of accredited investors that can participate,
however, is unlimited.155 Again, the unlimited number of accredited
investors is in keeping with the SEC’s investor protection concerns.
Because of their accredited investor status derived from either being
wealthy, having a high income, making a lot of money, or having an
executive level position within the company puts the investor in a position
where the investor can fend for himself and therefore the SEC does not
have to be concerned about the investor being taken advantage of.
Offers that Occur Entirely Within a Single State or Territory – The
“3(a)(11)
Exemption”
Offerings that occur entirely within a single state or territory are
likewise exempt from registration. This exemption is referred to as the
“3(a)(11) Exemption” – which, of course, refers to Section 3(a)(11) of the
’33 Act.156 Under the 3(a)(11) exemption, the issuer must be a resident of
and doing business within that state or territory and the investors must
149

17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6) (2021).
Id. § 230.501(a)(5).
151
Id. § 230.501(a)(4).
152
E.g., id. § 230.501(a)(1)–(3), (7)–(8).
153
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2021).
154
Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(i).
155
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (2021) (regulation D’s Rule
501(e)(1)(iv) specifically excludes accredited investors from the thirtyfive-purchaser cap set forth in Rule 506(b)). See also 17 C.F.R. §
230.506(b) (2021).
156
Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11); 15 U.S.C. § 77c.
150
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likewise be residents of that state or territory.157 Provided both of these
criteria are met, the company can issue securities to these in-state investors
with no limit as to how many investors can participate, no limit as to the
offering size, and no limit as to how much any one investor can invest.158
Staying within the strictures of the 3(a)(11) exemption from the
issuer’s standpoint revolves around understanding what it means to be a
“resident and doing business within that state.” To give practitioners
concrete guidelines to follow, the SEC promulgated Rules 147159 and
147A.160 These rules provide what are referred to as “safe harbor”
provisions where – if explicitly followed, the issuer knows that it qualifies
for the 3(a)(11) exemption. For example, what does it mean for a business
to be a resident within a state or territory? Rule 147(c)(1) notes “the issuer
shall be deemed to be a resident of the state or territory in which: it is
incorporated…and it has its principal place of business if a corporation. .
.”161 Thus, the rule gives clear quantifiable guidelines -explaining how an
issuer is deemed to be a resident. When the issuer is a corporation, being
incorporated in that state, plus having your principal place of business in
that state would be a clear indication of meeting 3(a)(11)’s residency
requirement where the issuer is a corporation.
Likewise, regarding the question of what it means to be “doing
business” within a specific state or territory. The idea principally is that the
issuer has operations significant enough within that state or territory to be
overseen, regulated, and held liable by state securities regulators if
something runs afoul with respect to the issuer and the securities being
issued.162 Again – The ’33 Act’s Section 3(a)(11) doesn’t define what it
means to be doing business within that state or territory, so Rule 147 again
gives quantifiable guidelines.
Under Rule 147 c.2. For example, an issuer is deemed to be doing
business within that state or territory if at least one of the following criteria
have been met.
i. The issuer has derived at least 80% of its revenues from
operations within that state.

157

Id.
Section 3(a)(11) makes no mention of offering size or investor
qualification. The only stipulations are that the issue and the investors
both be residents within that state or territory. Securities Act of 1933 §
3(a)(11); 15 U.S.C. § 77c.
159
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2021).
160
See id. § 230.147A.
161
Id. § 230.147(c)(1)(i)–(ii).
162
For a full discussion on the 3(a)(11) exemption and the corresponding
Rule 147 and Rule 147A, see 17 C.F.R. § 200, 230, 239, 240, 270, & 275,
and see also Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities
Offerings, Securities Act of 1933 Release Nos. 33-10238, 34-79161 (Oct.
26, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/33-10238.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/ZX4T-9JXB].
158
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ii. At least 80% of those issuer’s assets are located within
that state;
iii. The issuer intends to use and uses 80% of the offering
proceeds for in state operations; or
iv. A majority of the issuer’s employees are based in such
state or territory.163
The safe harbor criteria gives the issuer clear quantifiable
guidelines where the issuer knows with certainty that it meets the doing
business requirement by virtue of meeting at least one of these safe harbors.
It should also be noted and appreciated that the 3(a)(11) exemption is
construed narrowly. Meaning that ALL investors must be residence within
the state. If thousands of investors are state residents but there is one out of
state investor, including that one out of state investor is sufficient enough to
disqualify the issuer from the 3(a)(11) exemption. Such is the reason why
the 3(a)(11) exemption is not higher up on the preference list. Its strict
application makes it a fragile exemption that can easily break.
Regulation A – “Regulation A” – again referring to another
regulation that the SEC promulgated under the ’33 Act. Regulation A was
revised fairly recently pursuant to the J.O.B.S. Act.164 The prior version was
so onerous and cumbersome that practitioners rarely, if ever, used it as an
exempt offering option.165 The prior Regulation A version limited the
163

17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c)(2)(i)–(iv) (2021).
On March 25, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
“Commission”) adopted final rules to implement Section 401 of the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act by expanding Regulation A
into two tiers: Tier 1, for securities offerings of up to $20 million in a 12month period; and Tier 2, for securities offerings of up to $50 million in a
12-month period. An issuer of $20 million or less of securities can elect to
proceed under either Tier 1 or Tier 2. The 2015 amendments to Regulation
A built on the prior Regulation A and preserved, with some modifications,
the prior provisions regarding issuer eligibility, offering circular contents,
testing the waters, and “bad actor” disqualification. The 2015 amendments
modernized the Regulation A filing process for all offerings, aligned
practice in certain areas with prevailing practice for registered offerings,
created additional flexibility for issuers in the offering process, and
established an ongoing reporting regime for certain Regulation A issuers.
Amendments to Regulation A: A Small Business Guide, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/regulation-a-amendmentssecg.shtml [https://perma.cc/G67L-QB5Q]; see also 17 C.F.R. §
230.251(b) (2014) (pre-J.O.B.S. Act) (amended in 2015 by 17 C.F.R. §
230).
165
For a full discussion on the Regulation A phenomena and its near
extinction before being revived through the J.O.B.S Act, see Neal
Newman, Let Sleeping Regs Lie: A Diatribe on Regulation A’s Futility
Before and After the J.O.B.S. Act, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 65, 68 (2015),
164

180

OHIO STATE BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:1

offering size to $5 million, but the disclosure and reporting requirements
were significant.166 Practitioners deemed the cost of doing a Regulation A
offering as far outweighing the benefits.167 Thus, the Regulation A
exemption was rarely used. That is until the J.O.B.S. Act came along and
made significant revisions to the Regulation A offering exemption.
The new Regulation A, often referred to as Regulation A+, features
a two-tiered offering system with the first tier covering offerings up to $20
million, and the second tier allowing for offerings up to $50 million.168
Attractive aspects to the new Regulation A+ exemption are the following:
1. Investors need not be accredited or have any type
of special sophistication which means that the issuer
can offer these securities to anyone.169
2. The Securities aren’t restricted – which means
that the securities can be re-sold without the issuer
having to register them or find an applicable
exemption.
3. As mentioned earlier, the offering cap is $50
million which is enough to meet capital raising
needs of most smaller privately owned
companies.170
On the less attractive side, the disclosure provisions are “robust.”
Regulation A+ requires significant financial and business disclosures upon
the initial offering, plus the issuer is mandated to provide ongoing periodic
financial and business disclosures.171 In spite of the author’s expectations to
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jbl/vol18/iss1/3
[https://perma.cc/4YYK-X3H6].
166
See id. at 72.
167
Id.
168
17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(1)–(2) (2021). NOTE: In November 2020, the
SEC “…voted to amend its rules in order to harmonize, simplify, and
improve the multilayer and overly complex exempt offering framework.”
Among other things, these rule changes will raise the cap on Regulation
A’s Tier 2 offerings from $50 million to $75 million. See Press Release,
SEC, SEC Harmonizes and Improves “Patchwork” Exempt Offering
Framework (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020273 [https://perma.cc/TNR5-7ZVH].
169
Regulation A consists of Rules 251-263. No investor qualifications
such as net income, net worth, or investor sophistication are noted in any
of these rules. See Regulation A: Rules 251–263. However, Regulation A
does limit the amount a non-accredited investor can invest. That amount is
generally 10% of their net income or 10% of their net worth – whichever
is greater. See Regulation A Rule 251(d)(2)(C).
170
For Tier 2 offerings for Regulation A, the offering amount can be up to
$50 million – see Regulation A Rule 251(a)(2).
171
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.257(a) (2021) (for Tier 1 filers); see 17 C.F.R. §
230.257(b) (2021) (for Tier 2 filers).
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the contrary, Regulation A+ has proven to be quite popular among issuers.
When Regulation A+ users were questioned as to why they chose to do
their offering under Regulation A+ instead of the more often used
Regulation D, issuers explained that not having to worry about whether the
investors were accredited was a huge factor in their decision.172 Also, the
author thought that the ongoing periodic reporting requirement would have
been a big deterrent as well. When issuers were questioned about this
aspect, their response was interesting. Most of these companies were very
much expecting that they would soon be publicly traded companies anyway
so they thought it good form and “best practices” to get used to those
requirements. The author thought that was an interesting response given the
high failure rate for most of these companies. “Pessimist” and
“entrepreneur” are rarely used in the same sentence.
The Crowdfunding Exemption
The final private offering exemption to be discussed is the
Crowdfunding exemption. Perhaps the private exemption most familiar to
the general public because of the fact that it harkens back to the “go fund
me” efforts which is the premise upon which the Crowdfunding exemption
was built. Under the crowdfunding exemption, issuers can offer up to
$5,000,000 in securities in any twelve month period without having to
register the offering.173 Under the crowdfunding provision, the amount any
one issuer can invest is capped.174 The cap is based on the investor’s net
income or net worth. For investors whose net worth or annual income is
less than $107,000 annually, the amount the investor can invest is capped at
the greater of $2,200 or five percent of either the investor’s annual income
or their net worth; whichever is less.175
If the investor’s annual income or net worth is greater than
$100,000 then the amount the investor can invest is 10% of the investor’s
annual income or net worth, where the investment amount cannot exceed
$107,000 in any event.176 Again, the design here is to limit the exposure or
the risk of loss by limiting the aggregate offering amount allowed and by
limiting the amount that anyone investor can invest. Caps on the offering
172

Neal Newman, Regulation A+: New and Improved after the JOBS Act
or a Failed Revival, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 243, 271 (2018) (providing a
full discussion regarding Regulation A issuers and their decision making
process for choosing the Regulation A exemption).
173
See 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1) (2021); In November 2020, the SEC “
…voted to amend its rules in order to harmonize, simplify, and improve
the multilayer and overly complex exempt offering framework.” Among
other things, these rule changes will raise the offering limit on Regulation
Crowdfunding from $1.07 million to $5 million. See Press Release 2020273, SEC, SEC Harmonizes and Improves “Patchwork” Exempt Offering
Framework (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020273 [https://perma.cc/QM7C-LRF7].
174
17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1)–(2) (2021).
175
Id. § 227.100(a)(2)(i).
176
Id. § 227.100(a)(2)(ii).
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size and how much any one investor can invest makes the crowdfunding
exemption self-restraining.
The key for practitioners and issuers alike is to find the
exemption(s) that fit best. Ideally, both short term and long-term
considerations are factored into the decision. Historically, Regulation D’s
Rule 506(b) provision has been the most often used. But times are
changing. There is a feeling that it’s time to open up the investor pool and
look beyond what has historically been a place occupied by the wealthy
with their accredited investor status. Private exemptions like Regulation A+
are opening the door to a wider pool of investors and are allowing more
people to build wealth through investing while at the same time
participating in growing the economy.
IV. DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT
With the SEC Division of Enforcement’s annual report for fiscal
year 2020 we find, “a comprehensive view of the Division’s
accomplishments over the past year, [discussion about] significant actions
and key areas of strategic change, and details of the Division’s COVID-19related enforcement efforts.”177 SEC Chairman at the time Jay Clayton
states, “This year’s report highlights Enforcement’s extraordinary efforts
across the country to identify wrongdoing and take meaningful action to
protect American investors from misconduct, including in the face of the
many challenges imposed by COVID-19.”178 Working both at headquarters
and in the eleven regional offices, the SEC during FY2020:
brought a diverse mix of 715 enforcement actions, including
405 standalone actions. These actions addressed a broad
range of significant issues, including issuer disclosure and
accounting violations; foreign bribery; investment advisory
issues; securities offerings; market manipulation; insider
trading; and broker-dealer misconduct. Through these
actions, the SEC obtained judgments and orders totaling
approximately $4.68 billion in disgorgement and penalties ̶
a record amount for the Commission ̶ and returned more than
$600 million to harmed investors. Significantly, through the
Division’s efforts, the SEC awarded a record $175 million
to 39 whistleblowers in fiscal year 2020, both the highest
dollar amount and the highest number of individuals
awarded in any year.179

177

Press Release 2020-274, SEC, SEC Division of Enforcement Publishes
Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2020, (Nov. 2, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-274
[https://perma.cc/C2UX-88YS].
178
Id.
179
Id.
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Division of Enforcement Director Stephanie Avakian observes that
during FY2020, “the Division continued to investigate and recommend
actions addressing conduct that spanned the securities markets, including
conduct involving financial fraud, insider trading, offering fraud, Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act violations, misconduct by broker-dealers and
investment advisors, and more. . . the Commission brought hundreds of
enforcement actions and secured meaningful remedies. . .”180 Exhibit 2 shows
that most of the 405 standalone cases brought by the Commissions during
FY “2020 concerned securities offerings (32%), investment advisory and
investment company issues (21%), and issuer reporting/accounting and
auditing (15%) matters. The SEC also continued to bring actions relating to
broker-dealers (10%), insider trading (8%), and market manipulation (5%). .
. Public Finance (3%) and FCPA (2%).”181

Exhibit 2
Types of Cases182

180

SEC 2020 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
Id. at 16.
182
Id. at 18.
181
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Presented in Exhibit 3 is a Summary Chart of Enforcement actions
brought during fiscal year 2020 by the Commission by primary classification.

Exhibit 3
Summary of Enforcement actions for FY 2020183

183

Id at 29.
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Comprehensive coverage of the Division of Enforcement is beyond
the scope of this one law review article. However, a better understanding of
the important work of the Commission is achieved by taking a closer look
at various areas of enforcement activities. Accordingly, we will now present
a summary of some of the major issues and challenges confronting the
Commission, including such topics as: accounting fraud; COVID-19
abuses; misconduct by Issuers and Registrants; holding individuals
accountable; protecting retail investors; improving the pace of
investigations; rewarding cooperation; and the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA).
Accounting Fraud
While many of the activities of the Division of Enforcement may
fall into one of the other categories we will discuss during the next few
pages, those arising from some sort of accounting fraud are all too common.
Accordingly, we provide in Exhibit 4 just one example of the many that are
representative.
Exhibit 4
Luckin Coffee Agrees to Pay
$180 Million Penalty to Settle Accounting Fraud Charges
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2020-319
Washington D.C., Dec. 16, 2020 —
The Securities and Exchange Commission today
charged China-based company Luckin Coffee Inc. with
defrauding investors by materially misstating the company’s
revenue, expenses, and net operating loss in an effort to
falsely appear to achieve rapid growth and increased
profitability and to meet the company’s earnings estimates.
Luckin, whose American Depositary Shares traded on
Nasdaq until July 13, 2020, has agreed to pay a $180 million
penalty to resolve the charges.
The SEC’s complaint alleges that, from at least
April 2019 through January 2020, Luckin intentionally
fabricated more than $300 million in retail sales by using
related parties to create false sales transactions through three
separate purchasing schemes. According to the complaint,
certain Luckin employees attempted to conceal the fraud by
inflating the company’s expenses by more than $190
million, creating a fake operations database, and altering
accounting and bank records to reflect the false sales.
The complaint further alleges that the company
intentionally and materially overstated its reported revenue
and expenses and materially understated its net loss in its
publicly disclosed financial statements in 2019. For
example, Luckin allegedly materially overstated its reported
revenue by approximately 28% for the period ending June
30, 2019, and by 45% for the period ending Sept. 30, 2019,
in its publicly disclosed financial statements. The complaint
alleges that during the period of the fraud, Luckin raised
more than $864 million from debt and equity investors. After
Luckin’s misconduct was discovered in the course of the
annual external audit of the company’s financial statements,
Luckin reported the matter to and cooperated with SEC staff,
initiated an internal investigation, terminated certain
personnel, and added internal accounting controls.
“Public issuers who access our markets, regardless
of where they are located, must not provide false or
misleading information to investors,” said Stephanie
Avakian, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.
“While there are challenges in our ability to effectively hold
foreign issuers and their officers and directors accountable
to the same extent as U.S. issuers and persons, we will
continue to use all our available resources to protect
investors when foreign issuers violate the federal securities
laws.”
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“The SEC's complaint alleges that Luckin’s
disclosures to investors about its revenues were false,” said
Carolyn M. Welshhans, Associate Director of the SEC’s
Division of Enforcement. “The settlement with Luckin is
designed to help ensure that harmed investors have the best
available opportunity to receive relief.”
The SEC’s complaint, filed today in the Southern
District of New York, charges Luckin with violating the
antifraud, reporting, books and records, and internal control
provisions of the federal securities laws. Without admitting
or denying the allegations, Luckin has agreed to a
settlement, subject to court approval, that includes
permanent injunctions and the payment of a $180 million
penalty. This payment may be offset by certain payments
Luckin makes to its security holders in connection with its
provisional liquidation proceeding in the Cayman
Islands. The transfer of funds to the security holders will be
subject to approval by Chinese authorities. . .184
Covid-19 Pandemic
Former Enforcement Division Director Stephanie Avakian writes,
“the real story of 2020 was COVID-19. It colored so much of the last half
of the year ̶ what we focused on, investigations we opened, actions we
recommended, how we did our work, where we did our work, and how we
allocated our resources.”185 Reflecting during November 2020, Director
Avakian writes:
By mid-March, the entire Division had transitioned to
mandatory telework and essentially all of our operations
were conducted remotely. Despite this shift in working
conditions ̶ and the still ongoing efforts to adapt to those
conditions ̶ we quickly dedicated substantial resources to
address the emerging threats presented by COVID-19 and
the ensuing dynamic market conditions. At the same time,
we continue to focus on the multitude of existing and new
non-COVID-related enforcement issues arising in the
normal course. . .

184
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First, we quickly committed substantial resources to
protecting retail investors by actively looking for
misconduct. In March, we formed a Coronavirus Steering
Committee to oversee this effort by coordinating
investigations relating to a wide variety of potential
misconduct in the areas of microcap, insider trading, and
financial fraud and issuer disclosure. . .
In March and April alone, the Commission
suspended trading in the securities of two dozen issuers
where there were questions regarding the accuracy and
adequacy of information related to COVID-19 that those
issuers injected into the marketplace, including claims about
potential COVID-19 treatments, the manufacture and sale of
personal protection equipment, and disaster response
capabilities.
All told, from mid-March through the end of the
fiscal year, the Division’s Office of Market Intelligence
triaged approximately 16,000 tips, complaints, and referrals
(a roughly 71% increase over the same time period last year),
and the Division opened more than 150 COVID-related
inquiries and investigations and recommended several
COVID-related fraud actions to the Commission. We think
this triage and investigative work, and the resulting
Commission trading suspensions and fraud actions,
meaningfully changed the landscape for investors during a
period of significant market uncertainty. . .
In the early months of the pandemic, many of us
spent the bulk of our time focused on learning and guiding
our staff how to effectively do our job remotely. But we
moved past that initial period of uncertainty and ultimately
achieved a remarkable level of success, including bringing
more than 700 enforcement cases during the fiscal year.
Viewed against the backdrop of COVID-19, this was an
extraordinary accomplishment.186
The COVID-19 pandemic has presented numerous violations of
securities law. Just one example of alleged fraud violations is represented by
the following SEC press release, SEC Charges Biotech Company and CEO
With Fraud Concerning COVID-19 Blood Testing Device, found in Exhibit
5.
Exhibit 5
SEC Charges Biotech Company and CEO
With Fraud Concerning COVID-19 Blood Testing Device
186
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2020-327
Washington D.C., Dec. 18, 2020 —
The Securities and Exchange Commission today
announced charges against California-based biotechnology
company Decision Diagnostics Corp. and its CEO, Keith
Berman, with making false and misleading claims in
numerous press releases that the company had developed a
working, break-through technology that could accurately
detect Covid-19 through a quick blood test. The SEC
temporarily suspended trading in Decision Diagnostics'
securities on April 23, 2020.
The SEC's complaint alleges that Decision
Diagnostics and Berman seized upon the global pandemic
through a series of press releases that falsely claimed
Decision Diagnostics had developed a finger prick blood test
that could detect Covid-19 in less than a minute. According
to the complaint, from March 2020 to at least June 2020,
Decision Diagnostics and Berman made false and
misleading statements about the existence of Decision
Diagnostics' Covid-19 device and progress towards FDA
emergency use authorization. As alleged, at the time of these
claims, Decision Diagnostics lacked a proven method for
detecting the virus and had no physical testing device.
Further, its advisors had warned that the testing kit they were
trying to manufacture would not work as Decision
Diagnostics had described. The complaint also alleges that
the statements created the misleading impression that the test
was soon to be introduced to the market and led to surges in
the price and trading volume of Decision Diagnostics' stock.
"During this unprecedented time, when the need for
truthful disclosures concerning Covid-19 tests is of vital
importance, Decision Diagnostics and its CEO allegedly
misled investors by claiming to have made a working test
device when all they had was an idea that had not
materialized into a product," said Stephanie Avakian,
Director of the Division of Enforcement. "With the onset of
the global pandemic, we quickly pivoted to identify potential
areas of fraud. This case is another example of how the
Commission will hold accountable those who exploit the
pandemic to harm investors."
"In our complaint, we allege that Decision
Diagnostics and Berman repeatedly made baseless
representations to the investing public about market-moving
events like progress in obtaining FDA approval and having
breakthrough technology," said Anita B. Bandy, Associate
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Director of the Division of Enforcement. "Today's filing is a
credit to the dedicated SEC staff, who continued to
investigate after the trading suspension and quickly
uncovered the alleged fraud."
The complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York, charges Decision
Diagnostics and Berman with violating antifraud provisions
of the securities laws. The SEC is seeking a court order
permanently enjoining both Decision Diagnostics and
Berman from directly or indirectly violating those
provisions and ordering them to pay civil penalties.
The Department of Justice's Market Integrity and
Major Frauds Unit announced today that parallel criminal
charges against Berman were also filed in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia.187
Misconduct By Issuers and Registrants
The SEC states that “A cornerstone of our enforcement program is
ensuring that entities are held accountable for their misconduct.”188 During
FY2020, the SEC “brought actions against financial institutions, automobile
and engine manufacturers, and technology, telecommunications, and
pharmaceutical companies, to name a few.”189 While a number of examples
are listed in the 2020 Annual Report for the Division of Enforcement, the
following are representative:
• Wells Fargo & Co. In a settled action, the Commission
found that Wells Fargo misled investors about the
success of its core business strategy at a time when it
was opening unauthorized or fraudulent accounts for
unknowing customers and selling unnecessary products
that went unused. Wells Fargo was ordered to pay the
SEC a $500 million penalty as part of a combined $3
billion settlement with the SEC and the Department of
Justice.
• Telegram Group Inc. The Commission filed an
emergency action and obtained a temporary restraining
order against Telegram and its wholly-owned subsidiary
TON Issuer Inc. for allegedly operating an unregistered
offering of digital tokens called ‘Grams’ in violation of
the federal securities laws. On the Commission’s
motion, the court issued a preliminary injunction barring
187
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the delivery of Grams and finding that the Commission
had shown a substantial likelihood of proving that
Telegram’s sales were part of a larger scheme to
unlawfully distribute the Grams to the secondary public
market. Following this decision, the defendants agreed
to settle the action and were ordered to return more than
$1.2 billion to investors and pay an $18.5 million civil
penalty.
Bausch Health, formerly Valeant Pharmaceuticals. In a
settled action, the Commission found that Valeant
improperly recognized revenue and made misleading
disclosures in SEC filings and earnings presentations.
Bausch was ordered to pay a $45 million civil penalty.190

An instructive example representative of the many actions brought
by the Commission falling under the category of “misconduct by issuers and
registrants” is found in the 2021 press release SEC Charges Vuuzle Media
Corp. and Affiliated Individuals in Connection With $14 Million Offering
Fraud, as shown in Exhibit 6.
Exhibit 6
SEC Charges Vuuzle Media Corp. and Affiliated Individuals in Connection
With $14 Million Offering Fraud
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2021-18
Washington D.C., Jan. 27, 2021 —
The Securities and Exchange Commission today
charged Vuuzle Media Corporation, a purported online live
streaming and entertainment company, and its founder
Ronald Shane Flynn (a.k.a. Ronnie Shane) with fraudulently
offering over $14 million in securities to investors across the
United States using an aggressive boiler room sales scheme.
The SEC’s complaint alleges that between 2016 and
2020, Vuuzle and Flynn raised more than $14 million from
individual investors using a boiler room of salespeople
employing high-pressure tactics, based primarily in the
Philippines. According to the complaint, Vuuzle and Flynn
promised investors that Vuuzle was a legitimate and
growing company and a “pre-IPO” investment opportunity
when in fact Vuuzle has never made a profit and has never
made a public offering on any stock exchange. As alleged,
only a small fraction of investor funds went towards the
online streaming business. The complaint further alleges that
Flynn misappropriated $4.9 million of investor funds for his
190
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personal use, including by using it to pay for jewelry, luxury
flights and hotel stays, subscriptions to dating websites, and
nightclub visits. Vuuzle and Flynn also allegedly used at
least $5.5 million of investor funds to sustain the boiler room
and pay commissions to Flynn and others for recruiting
investors. The complaint also charged Richard Marchitto
with aiding and abetting Flynn and Vuuzle’s fraud by
allegedly acting as their U.S. corporate and financial
presence and maintaining a U.S. bank account, corporate
credit cards, and a New York office address for Vuuzle.
“We are committed to taking action to protect
investors and pursuing relief for those who have been
harmed,” said Melissa Hodgman, Acting Director of the
SEC’s Division of Enforcement. “We will vigorously pursue
fraudsters who enrich themselves at investors’ expense.”
“The defendants allegedly raised millions of dollars
from investors through aggressive and deceptive sales
techniques, and misappropriated the majority of those funds
for personal use and to fund the boiler room operation,” said
Jennifer S. Leete, Associate Director in the SEC’s Division
of Enforcement. “Investors should be on alert for red flags
of investor fraud such as unsolicited calls and high pressure
sales tactics.”
The complaint, filed in federal court in the District
of New Jersey, charges Vuuzle and Flynn with violating the
antifraud and registration provisions of the federal securities
laws, and Marchitto with aiding and abetting Vuuzle and
Flynn’s violations. The SEC seeks permanent injunctive
relief, disgorgement with prejudgment interest, and civil
penalties against each defendant. . .191
Holding Individuals Accountable
To better understand how the regulation of markets and those
involved in the securities industry is conducted, the SEC states, “We have
long recognized that individual accountability is critical to an effective
enforcement program. Institutions act through their employees, and holding
culpable individuals responsible for wrongdoing is essential to achieving our
goals of general and specific deterrence and protecting investors by removing
bad actors from our markets.”192 The SEC takes action based upon a theory
placing premium “on establishing individual liability where appropriate. In
191
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Fiscal Year 2020, the Commission charges individuals in 72% of the
standalone enforcement actions it brought.”193 Consider:
Those charged include individuals at the top of the corporate
hierarchy, including numerous CEOs and CFOs, as well as
accountants, auditors, and other gatekeepers. Just by way of
example, former executives of Valeant Pharmaceuticals,
Goldman Sachs Group Inc., and Iconix Brand Group Inc., as
well as former audit partners of KPMG LLP, were charged
with a range of violations, including fraud, reporting, books
and records, and internal accounting controls.194
Protecting Retail Investors
The Commission continues to bring actions “involving the conduct
of investment professionals as it relates to retail investors.”195 For example,
during Fiscal Year 2020 the Division of Enforcement “filed an action
against Wells Fargo for failing reasonably to supervise investment advisers
and registered representatives who recommended complex, high-volatility
single-inverse ETFs to retail investors, and for lacking adequate compliance
policies and procedures with respect to the suitability of those
recommendations.”196 A penalty of $35 million was imposed to resolve this
matter, with proceeds distributed to harmed investors.197 In sum, for the
fiscal year, the Commission reports having “distributed more than $600
million to harmed investors.”198 Exhibit 7 depicts just one example of an
action brought to protect retail investors.
Exhibit 7
SEC Charges Boiler Rooms Operator with Defrauding Retail Investors
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2020-298
Washington D.C., Dec. 1, 2020 —
The SEC today charged New York resident Mark
Alan Lisser with fraud for operating at least two boiler
rooms, on Long Island, New York and in Boca Raton,
Florida, through which he raised approximately $2.1 million
from at least 71 retail investors and misappropriated more
than $900,000 of their funds.
According to the SEC’s complaint, from
approximately October 2018 to March 2019, Lisser, and
salespeople that he directed in the boiler rooms, solicited
193
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investors for Knightsbridge Capital Partners, an unregistered
fund manager he operated, by misrepresenting that the
Knightsbridge-managed funds had purchased “pre-IPO”
shares in three well-known companies directly from
employees of the companies. As the complaint alleges,
Knightsbridge did not own any shares at the time it solicited
investors and subsequently purchased shares or interests in
shares of the companies from third parties, not employees.
Additionally, as alleged in the complaint, Knightsbridge
never owned enough shares to cover the sales it had made to
investors.
The complaint further alleges that Lisser and his
salespeople falsely claimed to investors that Knightsbridge
only charged investors a fee based on the profits after the
pre-IPO companies went public, such that Knightsbridge
and the investors were on the “same side of the trade,”
despite significantly marking up sales and charging
commissions. According to the complaint, Lisser
misappropriated over $900,000 of investor funds, including
by transferring some of the funds to his personal bank
account and using investor funds to pay credit card bills.
“As alleged in the complaint, Lisser victimized
dozens of retail investors through high pressure sales tactics,
misrepresentations and misappropriation of their funds,”
said Richard R. Best, Director of the SEC’s New York
Regional Office. “This case demonstrates our continuing
commitment to hold accountable those who operate oldfashioned boiler rooms to solicit investors’ hard-earned
savings.”
The SEC’s complaint, filed in federal court for the
Eastern District of New York, charges Lisser with violations
of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and seeks injunctive
relief, disgorgement plus prejudgment interest, and civil
penalties.
In a parallel action, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for
the Eastern District of New York earlier today filed criminal
charges against Lisser.199
Investigation Pace Accelerated
During FY 2020, Enforcement continued its goal, “to focus on
shortening the amount of time it takes to complete investigations and
199
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recommend enforcement actions. Our actions have the greatest impact when
filed as close in time to the conduct as possible. Our median time to file this
past year was 21.6 months ̶ a five year best.”200 The Enforcement Division
states:
More specifically, we have also seen improvements in the
length of time it takes to bring financial fraud and issuer
disclosure cases. In appropriate cases, we are increasing
staffing, working to more efficiently triage issues, making
more targeted requests at the onset, substantively engaging
early in an investigation with relevant parties, and
leveraging cooperation. These changes have had the desired
effect: in Fiscal Year 2020, we reduced the average amount
of time it takes to complete these investigations from 37
months to 34 months. Some notable examples include
settled charges against a Bermuda-based insurance company
for failing to fully disclose perquisites and benefits provided
to its former chief executive officer, brought fifteen months
after the Division opened an investigation, and a settled
action against Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. addressing
similar violations, brought roughly eight months after the
Division began its investigation. . .201
Rewarding Cooperation
The SEC often provides incentives to issuers or individuals under
investigation for their meaningful cooperation. To increase efficiency, the
Commission during FY 2020, “continued to focus on rewarding cooperation
and providing greater transparency into how the Commission considers and
weighs cooperation credit.”202 Accordingly, Enforcement provides two
examples ̶ “in one the Commission ordered a reduced penalty in recognition
of substantial cooperation and in the other the Commission determined to not
impose a penalty at all.”203 Accordingly:
In the Commission’s action against BMU, the Commission
imposed a reduced civil penalty against BMW in recognition
of its extensive cooperation, especially in light of COVID19 challenges. Despite considerable constraints, including
travel restrictions, work-from-home orders, and office
closures, BMW gathered and made available a large volume
of information in response to document, information, and
data requests. BMW also made multiple current and former
employees available for interviews, and provided
presentations and narrative submissions that highlighted
200
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critical facts. Due in large part to this cooperation, we were
able to complete this case within 12 months of opening it.
In the Commission’s action against Transamerica
Asset Management, Inc., a registered investment adviser
based in Denver, Colorado, the Commission did not impose
a penalty where Transamerica self-reported the conduct,
took prompt steps to remediate the violations, and
cooperated with the staff’s investigation. We recognize the
value in communicating such examples of meaningful
cooperation and will continue to look for opportunities to
improve our messaging going forward.204
An example of the Commission rewarding instances of cooperation
is found in the last paragraph of the press release regarding settled charges
brought against The Cheesecake Factory for COVID-19-related disclosure
violations. This information is presented in Exhibit 8.
Exhibit 8
SEC Charges The Cheesecake Factory For Misleading COVID-19
Disclosures
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2020-306
Washington D.C., Dec. 4, 2020 —
The Securities and Exchange Commission today
announced settled charges against The Cheesecake Factory
Incorporated for making misleading disclosures about the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its business
operations and financial condition. The action is the SEC's
first charging a public company for misleading investors
about the financial effects of the pandemic.
As set forth in the SEC's order, in its SEC filings on
March 23 and April 3, 2020, The Cheesecake Factory stated
that its restaurants were "operating sustainably" during the
COVID-19 pandemic. According to the order, the filings
were materially false and misleading because the company's
internal documents at the time showed that the company was
losing approximately $6 million in cash per week and that it
projected that it had only 16 weeks of cash remaining. The
order finds that although the company did not disclose this
internal information in its March 23 and April 3 filings, the
company did share this information with potential private
equity investors or lenders in connection with an effort to
seek additional liquidity. The order also finds that, although
the March 23 filing described actions the company had
undertaken to preserve financial flexibility during the
204
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pandemic, it failed to disclose that The Cheesecake Factory
had already informed its landlords that it would not pay rent
in April due to the impacts that COVID-19 inflicted on its
business.
"During the pandemic, many public companies have
discharged their disclosure obligations in a commendable
manner, working proactively to keep investors informed of
the current and anticipated material impacts of COVID-19
on their operations and financial condition," said SEC
Chairman Jay Clayton. "As our local and national response
to the pandemic evolves, it is important that issuers continue
their proactive, principles-based approach to disclosure,
tailoring these disclosures to the firm and industry-specific
effects of the pandemic on their business and operations. It
is also important that issuers who make materially false or
misleading statements regarding the pandemic’s impact on
their business and operations be held accountable."
"When public companies describe for investors the
impact of COVID-19 on their business, they must speak
accurately," said Stephanie Avakian, Director of the
Division of Enforcement. "The Enforcement Division,
including the Coronavirus Steering Committee, will
continue to scrutinize COVID-related disclosures to ensure
that investors receive accurate, timely information, while
also giving appropriate credit for prompt and substantial
cooperation in investigations."
The SEC's order finds that The Cheesecake Factory
violated reporting provisions of the federal securities laws.
Without admitting the findings in the order, The Cheesecake
Factory agreed to pay a $125,000 penalty and to cease-anddesist from further violations of the charged provisions. In
determining to accept the settlement, the SEC considered the
cooperation afforded by The Cheesecake Factory…205
Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA)
Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price observe, “The societal cancer of
bribery, extortion, or corruption in any of its various forms exacts an
unacceptable toll on all citizens of the world.”206 Pervasive global bribery
205
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and corruption results in starving populations, the movement of millions of
refugees into often unwelcoming neighboring countries, leading to political
instability. This familiar scenario, resulting from bribery and corruption is a
root cause of war. Recent history in the Middle East confirms research by
Transparency International, “that Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Palestine all
suffer from unchecked executive power and lack access to information laws
and whistleblower protection legislation, greatly hindering citizens’ ability
to report and stop corruption practices.”207
In sum, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) primarily
addresses two distinct activities: bribery and improper record-keeping. In
relevant part, the statute prohibits (1) payments of anything of value to
foreign officials “in order to assist [the payor] in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business to, any person;”208 and (2) failing
to keep records and books “which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly
reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”209
Therefore, “When the FCPA is read as a whole, its core of criminality is seen
to be bribery of a foreign official to induce him to perform an official duty in
a corrupt manner.”210
These prohibitions within the statute apply to virtually every
company, whether public or private, or person that touches the United States.
Four categories of actors are covered: (1) “issuers” (public companies);211 (2)
any business with its principal place of business in the United States or that
is organized under the laws of any state, territory, possession, or
207
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commonwealth of the United States (private companies);212 (3) United States
citizens, nationals, and residents; and (4) other persons who take any act in
furtherance of the corrupt payment while within the territory of the United
States.213
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Kay, considered one of the most
comprehensive FPCA cases,214 explained the anti-bribery portion of the
statute as criminalizing:
only those payments that are intended to (1)
influence a foreign official to act or make a
decision in his official capacity, or (2)
induce such official to perform or refrain
from performing some act in violation of his
duty, or (3) secure some wrongful
advantage to the payor. And even then, the
FCPA criminalizes these kinds of payments
only if the result they are intended to
produce—their quid pro quo—will assist
(or is intended to assist) the payor in efforts
to get or keep some business for or with
“any person.”‘215
In order to be criminally liable under the FCPA, the person making,
promising, or offering the payment must have a “corrupt intent” and “[t]he
payment must be intended to induce to the recipient to misuse his [or her]
official position to direct business wrongfully to the payer.”216 Indeed, “the
word ‘corruptly’ in the FCPA signifies, in addition to the element of ‘general
intent’ present in most criminal statutes, a bad or wrongful purpose and an
intent to influence a foreign official to misuse his official position.”217 While
the bribe must be to a foreign official, “[i]t should be noted that the business
to be obtained does not need to be with a foreign government or foreign
government instrumentality;” rather it need only be with any person or entity

212
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within the foreign country.218 All that matters is that the giver of the bribe
intends the receiver to do something.219 The meaning of “foreign official” is
quite broad, including employees of partially state-owned or state-run
entities—such as national hospitals, airlines, or oil companies—or private
entities handling a government function.220 Indeed, in a country like China
where many businesses are partially or wholly state-owned, virtually anyone
can be a government official.221
In addition to anti-bribery provisions, the FCPA also contains
record-keeping provisions that apply to public companies and are enforced
by the SEC.222 The FCPA makes it a crime to “make false or misleading
entries on a company’s books for any purpose whatsoever.”223 Indeed, even
proper “facilitating payments” violate the FCPA if they are not properly
accounted for.224 These accounting provisions do not apply to foreign
subsidiaries who are not “issuers” of securities in the American market.225
However, where an “issuer” has majority interest in a foreign subsidiary, it
must ensure the subsidiary has adequate internal accounting controls in
place.226 When a wholly owned subsidiary violates the books and records
provisions, parent corporations are civilly liable regardless of whether the
parent company had any knowledge.227
218

THE UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. DOJ LAYPERSON’S GUIDE
TO THE FCPA, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-

persons-guide.pdf.
Aaron G. Murphy, Practitioner Note: The Migratory Patterns of
Business in the Global Village, 2 N.Y.U.J.L. & BUS. 218, at 237 n.31
(2005).
220
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2).
221
Lawrence J. Trautman, American Entrepreneur in China: Potholes on
the Silk Road to Prosperity, 12 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L.
427 (2012), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1995076
[https://perma.cc/9GTE-KNJ5].
222
15 U.S.C. § 78m-1.
223
O. Thomas Johnson, Jr., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1 Best ABA
SEC.: GEN. PRAC., SOLO & SMALL FIRM Sec. 38 (1997).
224
THE UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY CRIMINAL
RESOURCE MANUAL supra note 216. Interestingly, Deloitte Financial
Advisory Services recommends firms set up a separate facilitation
payments account and make all such payments out of it. Deloitte Financial
Advisory Services LLP Advisory, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act leading
practice considerations (2006).
225
United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 754 (5th Cir. 2004).
226
Id. at 755.
227
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, U.S. DOJ LAYPERSON’S
GUIDE TO THE FCPA supra note 218; see also Lawrence J. Trautman &
Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Minefield
for Directors, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 145, 146–47 (2011),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1930190 [https://perma.cc/U22E-9X9S];
Lawrence J. Trautman & Joanna Kimbell, Bribery and Corruption: The
219
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We are including language in Exhibit 9 from the 2008 press release
announcing the landmark settlement with Siemens AG regarding worldwide
bribery. When internal legal and compliance expenses are included, this
litigation is regarded as having cost the company well over $1.5 billion (US).
Exhibit 9
SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2008-294
Washington D.C., Dec. 15, 2008 —
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced
an unprecedented settlement with Siemens AG to resolve
SEC charges that the Munich, Germany-based manufacturer
of industrial and consumer products violated the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) by engaging in a systematic
practice of paying bribes to foreign government officials to
obtain business…
The SEC alleges that Siemens paid bribes on such
widespread transactions as the design and construction of
metro transit lines in Venezuela, power plants in Israel, and
refineries in Mexico. Siemens also used bribes to obtain such
business as developing mobile telephone networks in
Bangladesh, national identity cards in Argentina, and
medical devices in Vietnam, China, and Russia. According
to the SEC’s complaint, Siemens also paid kickbacks to Iraqi
ministries in connection with sales of power stations and
equipment to Iraq under the United Nations Oil for Food
Program. Siemens earned more than $1.1 billion in profits
on these and several other transactions.
Siemens has agreed to pay $350 million in
disgorgement to settle the SEC’s charges, and a $450 million
fine to the U.S. Department of Justice to settle criminal
charges. Siemens also will pay a fine of approximately $569
million to the Office of the Prosecutor General in Munich,
to whom the company previously paid an approximately
$285 million fine in October 2007…
The SEC’s complaint alleges that between March
12, 2001, and Sept. 30, 2007, Siemens created elaborate
payment schemes to conceal the nature of its corrupt
payments, and the company’s inadequate internal controls
allowed the conduct to flourish. Siemens made thousands of
payments to third parties in ways that obscured the purpose
COSO Framework, FCPA, and U.K. Bribery Act, 30 FLA. J. INT’L L. 191
(2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3239193 [https://perma.cc/6DKUQVC3].

OHIO STATE BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

202

[Vol. 16:1

for, and the ultimate receipt of, the money. Employees
obtained large amounts of cash from cash desks, which were
sometimes transported in suitcases across international
borders for bribery. The authorizations for payments were
placed on post-it notes and later removed to eradicate any
permanent record. Siemens used numerous slush funds, offbooks accounts maintained at unconsolidated entities, and a
system of business consultants and intermediaries to
facilitate the corrupt payments. Siemens made at least 4,283
payments, totaling approximately $1.4 billion, to bribe
government officials in return for business to Siemens
around the world. In addition, Siemens made approximately
$391 million, which were not properly controlled and were
used, at least in part, for such illicit purposes as commercial
bribery and embezzlement.
The misconduct involved employees at all levels,
including former senior management, and reveled a
corporate culture long at odds with the FCPA. The SEC’s
complaint alleges that despite the company’s knowledge of
bribery at two of its largest groups ̶ Communications and
Power Generation ̶ the tone at the top at Siemens was
inconsistent with an effective FCPA compliance program
and created a corporate culture in which bribery was
tolerated and even rewarded at the highest levels of the
company. In November, 2006, Siemen’s current
management began to implement reforms to the company’s
internal controls, which substantially reduced, but did not
entirely eliminate, corrupt payments. All but $27.5 million
of the corrupt payments occurred before Nov. 15, 2006.
Siemens violated Section 30A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) by making illicit
payments to foreign government officials in order to obtain
or retain business. Siemens violated Section 13(b)(2)(B) of
the Exchange Act by failing to have adequate internal
controls to detect and prevent the payments. Siemens
violated Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act by
improperly recording the payments on its books and
records…228
Some cases like the Siemens case illustrated above continue with
related matters being brought for years, as shown by the 2018 announcement
of a guilty plea reached in a matter dating back to 1998 involving an
228

Press Release 2008-294, SEC, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging
in Worldwide Bribery
(Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm
[https://perma.cc/6EPG-U6U4].
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admission of engaging, “in a decade-long scheme to pay tens of millions of
dollars in bribes to Argentine government officials in connection with a
[national identity card] project, which was worth more than $1 billion to
Siemens.”229 An example of a more contemporary FCPA case is provided in
Exhibit 10, involving charges against Deutsche Bank.
Exhibit 10
SEC Charges Deutsche Bank
With FCPA Violations Related to Third-Party Intermediaries
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2021-3
Washington D.C., Jan. 8, 2021 —
The Securities and Exchange Commission today
announced charges against Deutsche Bank AG for violations
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). As part of
coordinated resolutions with the SEC and the Department of
Justice, Deutsche Bank has agreed to pay more than $120
million, which includes more than $43 million to settle the
SEC’s charges.
According to the SEC’s order, Deutsche Bank
engaged foreign officials, their relatives, and their associates
as third-party intermediaries, business development
consultants, and finders to obtain and retain global business.
The order finds that Deutsche Bank lacked sufficient internal
accounting controls related to the use and payment of such
intermediaries, resulting in approximately $7 million in
bribe payments or payments for unknown, undocumented,
or unauthorized services. The order further finds that these
payments were inaccurately recorded as legitimate business
expenses and involved invoices and documentation falsified
by Deutsche Bank employees.
“While third parties can assist in legitimate business
development activities, it is critical that companies have
sufficient internal accounting controls in place to prevent
payments to third parties in furtherance of improper
purposes,” said Charles Cain, Chief of the SEC Enforcement
Division’s FCPA Unit.
The SEC’s order finds that Deutsche Bank violated
the books and records and internal accounting controls
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Deutsche
Bank agreed to a cease-and-desist order and to pay
disgorgement of $35 million with prejudgment interest of $8
229

Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Siemens Executive Pleads
Guilty to Role in $100 Million Foreign Bribery Scheme (March 15, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-siemens-executive-pleads-guiltyrole-100-million-foreign-bribery-scheme [https://perma.cc/DZ38-495R].

OHIO STATE BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

204

[Vol. 16:1

million to settle the action. The SEC did not impose a civil
penalty in light of the $79 million criminal penalty paid in
the criminal resolution…230
V. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE SEC
It was Chief Justice John Marshall who provided us with the
definition of a corporation when he wrote, “Corporations are artificial
beings, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”231
Accordingly, it is these state-granted charters that create corporations,
“their governance dictated by state law, with corporate directors responsible
for managing the affairs of the corporation…”232 Under Delaware law,
directors owe their corporation and shareholders fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty.233

230

Press Release 2021-3, SEC, SEC Charges Deutsche Bank With FCPA
Violations Related to Third-Party Intermediaries (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-3 [https://perma.cc/N45M5HWA].
231
Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)
(opinion of Marshall, C.J.); see also Todd Haugh, Nudging Corporate
Compliance, 54 Am. Bus. L.J. 683 (2017).
232
Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s Responsibility for
Director Selection and Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75, 78
(2012), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1998489 [https://perma.cc/C46UE6LY] (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 1991) (“The
business and affairs of a corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may
be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.”)). While more than half of all publicly-owned United
States corporations are chartered under the laws of the state of Delaware,
corporate counsel and directors will want to closely examine the laws of
relevant states when considering any particular matter; see also Gilson &
Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is
There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 248 (Feb.
1989) (“Delaware corporate law… governs the largest proportion of the
largest business transactions in history”); see Bradley R. Aronstam, The
Interplay of Blasius and Unocal—A Compelling Problem Justifying the
Call for Substantial Change, 81 OR. L. REV. 429, 429–30 n.4 (2002) (why
corporations prefer Delaware as their choice for incorporation); see also
Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Sits on Texas Corporate Boards? Texas
Corporate Directors: Who They Are and What They Do, 16 HOUS. BUS. &
TAX L.J. 44 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2493569
[https://perma.cc/J4GD-WGTD].
233
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see also Guth v.
Loft, A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (the duty of loyalty in Delaware requiring
that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest).
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The Duties and Responsibilities of Corporate Directors
Volumes have been written about corporate governance and the
role directors play in representing shareholders and other stakeholders in
the oversight of corporate entities. We will not attempt to duplicate that
effort here, given the space limitations imposed on law review articles.
However, more on this topic is provided in the footnote below.234 In sum,
the primary duties of care and loyalty are the legal standards determining
acceptable conduct for all boards and their directors.235

234

John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Essential
Elements of Corporate Law (Oxford Leg. Stud. Res., Working Paper No.
134, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1436551 [https://perma.cc/AL7FDR5A]; Stephen Mark Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2006),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=808584 [https://perma.cc/4PF7-2JHY]; Lucian
A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate
Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 787 (2009),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=593423 [https://perma.cc/L7BM-MBZU];
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance:
Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=761970 [https://perma.cc/9RZH-DGW9];
Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and
Firm Valuation, 25 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 410–11 (2006),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=754484 [https://perma.cc/9WMJ-NRUJ]; Brian
R. Cheffins, The History of Corporate Governance, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCe (Mike Wright, Donald Siegel,
Kevin Keasey & Igor Filatotchev eds., Oxford U. Press, 2013),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1975404 [https://perma.cc/W24K-JKVP]; John
C. Coffee, A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. And Europe
Differ (The Ctr. for L. and Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. 274, 2005),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=694581 [https://perma.cc/T79Y-SNHY]; Jeffrey
N. Gordon, Systematic Stewardship (Colum. L. and Econ., Working Paper
No. 640, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782814
[https://perma.cc/XBG8-JJVA]; Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of
Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. (2005),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=704025 [https://perma.cc/9XSX-DGMT];
Donald C. Langevoort & Hillary A. Sale, Corporate Adolescence: Why
Did 'We' not Work?, GEO. U. L. CTR. (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3762718 [https://perma.cc/X7DS-D3VK];
Veronica Root Martinez & Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Equality Metrics, 130
YALE L.J. F. 869 (2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3772895
[https://perma.cc/8LXG-PTXS].
235
Lawrence J. Trautman, The Board’s Responsibility for Crisis
Governance, 13 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 275, 282 (2017),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2623219 [https://perma.cc/823T-3E7D];
Lawrence J. Trautman, Present at the Creation: Reflections on the Early
Years of the National Association of Corporate Directors, 17 DUQ. BUS.
L.J. 1, 1–2 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2296427
[https://perma.cc/APR7-XMLD].
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How Boards Organize Their Work
For efficiency purposes, boards divide the individual work of
directors into standing committees. A particularly up-to-date discussion of
the role of the primary standing committees found on almost all public
company boards (audit, compensation, and nominating and governance
committees) is provided by seasoned corporate directors: Seletha Butler;
Michele Hooper; Ron McCray; and Ruth Simmons.236 Often, areas of
financial and other organizational risk will be assigned to the Audit
Committee, requiring that members of this committee be recruited for
unique talents and experiences.237
D&O Insurance
Elsewhere Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price reflect, “It is
unquestioned in today’s business and litigation climate that corporate
officers and directors face significant exposure based simply on their roles
and titles, no matter how effectively, carefully, or in good faith their
decisions are made.”238 Because of this risk, “Director and officer
insurance, called D&O, is designed to protect executives, outside directors,
as well as the companies they serve against liability arising from actions
taken in the course of doing business.”239 Consider that claims brought:
Against officers and directors come in many forms, ranging
from common law claims for breach of fiduciary duty to
shareholder class actions for violations of the securities
laws. Even when these allegations are baseless, companies ̶
as well as individual directors and officers ̶ may still face
significant defense and settlement costs. D&O insurance, in
tandem with indemnification, is designed to protect against
the legal expenses of fighting litigation, as well as the
underlying liability exposure.240

236

Lawrence J. Trautman, Seletha Butler, Frederick Chang, Michele
Hooper, Ron McCray & Ruth Simmons, Corporate Directors: Who They
Are, What They Do, Cyber and Other Contemporary Challenges, 70
BUFF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (Professor Fred Chang providing an
excellent discussion about cybersecurity issues and challenges).
237
Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee
Financial Expert Under SEC Regulations and NYSE Rules?, 11 DEPAUL
BUS. & COM. L.J. 205, 213 (2013),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2137747 [https://perma.cc/A43W-49TH].
238
Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, D&O Insurance: A
Primer, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 337, 337 (2012),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1998080[https://perma.cc/K67E-8AWR].
239
Id.
240
Id.
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VI. GOVERNING TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES
As Deputy Attorney General Mark R. Filip observes over a decade
ago, “the infrastructure of the Internet is largely blind to national
boundaries and the speed with which communications occur today allows
for websites owned by people in Europe in Europe to be controlled from a
location in Asia and to be actually housed in California.”241 In addition to
proposing a specific cybersecurity standard of care,242 Professors Trautman
and Ormerod write:
The two chief sources of authority from which corporate
governance data security obligations flow are SarbanesOxley243 and the SEC’s 2011 guidance.244 Sarbanes-Oxley
requires public companies to implement appropriate
information security controls with regard to companies’
financial information.245 The SEC’s 2011 guidance
identifies risks to cybersecurity as potential material
information that companies are required to disclose under
pre-existing securities law disclosure requirements and
accounting standards.246
As 2021 begins, corporate boards and U.S. government agencies
are still trying to understand the full impact of the SolarWinds hack, “one of

241

Mark R. Filip, Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Deputy Attorney
General Mark R. Filip at the International Conference on Cyber Security
(Jan. 7, 2009), in DEP’T JUST. NEWS, Jan. 2009,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-prepared-delivery-deputyattorney-general-mark-r-filip-international-conference
[https://perma.cc/M28Z-7MYG]; see also Lawrence J. Trautman, Rapid
Technological Change and U.S. Entrepreneurial Risk in International
Markets: Focus on Data Security, Information Privacy, Bribery and
Corruption, 49 CAP. U. L. REV. 67 (2021),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2912072 [https://perma.cc/N7N6-GMDS].
242
Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Corporate Directors' and
Officers' Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 66
AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1236 (2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2883607
[https://perma.cc/AD5Q-9NFQ].
243
Id. at 1237 (citing The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–
204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended throughout U.S.C. titles 15, 18,
28, & 29)).
244
SEC, CORPORATE FINANCE DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2 (Oct.
13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidancetopic2.htm [https://perma.cc/U9LQ-5VXM].
245
Bruce H. Nearon, Jon Stanley, Steven W. Teppler, & Joseph Burton, Life
after Sarbanes-Oxley: The Merger of Information Security and
Accountability, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 379 (2005).
246
Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 242, at 1236–37.
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the worst in U.S. history.”247 The Wall Street Journal reports, “Dozens of
SolarWinds’ customers, including major technology companies such as
Microsoft Corp. and Cisco Systems Inc., were affected by the incident, as
well as the departments of the Treasury, Justice, Energy, Commerce, State,
Homeland Security, Labor and Energy.”248 Professors Larcker, Reiss and
Tayan write, “the board of directors is expected to ensure that management
has identified and developed processes to mitigate risks facing the
organization, including risks arising from data theft and the loss of
proprietary information. Unfortunately, general observation suggests that
companies are not doing a sufficient job of securing this data.”249
Challenge of Technology
Existing for just a little more than a decade, “Bitcoin and other
virtual currencies have had a major societal impact, and proven to be a
unique payment systems challenge for law enforcement, financial
regulatory authorities worldwide, and the investment community.”250
Elsewhere, Professor Trautman observes, “Rapid introduction and diffusion
of technological changes throughout society, such as the blockchain that
serves as Bitcoin’s crypto-foundation, continue to exceed the ability of law
247

Robert McMillan, Hackers Lurked in SolarWinds Email System for at
Least 9 Months, CEO Says, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 2, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/hackers-lurked-in-solarwinds-email-systemfor-at-least-9-months-ceo-says-11612317963 [https://perma.cc/C7TKGDUS].
248
Id.
249
David F. Larcker, Peter C. Reiss & Brian Tayan, Critical Update
Needed: Cybersecurity
Expertise in the Boardroom, in ROCK CTR. FOR
CORP. GOVERNANCE AT STAN. U. CLOSER
LOOK SERIES (No. CGRP-69,
Stan. U. Graduate Sch. of Bus. Research Paper No.17-702017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3074594 [https://perma.cc/R6UZ-MNKM]; see
also J. Robert Brown,
The Demythification of the Board of Directors,
52 AM. BUS L.J. 131 (2015).
250
Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies and the Struggle of
Law and Regulation to Keep Pace, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 447, 447 (2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182867 [https://perma.cc/M43E-7T9L]; see
also Lawrence J. Trautman & Mason J. Molesky, A Primer for
Blockchain, 88 UMKC L. REV. 239 (2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3324660 [https://perma.cc/CQ3R-5ZYU];
Lawrence J. Trautman, Mohammed T. Hussein, Louis Ngamassi & Mason
Molesky, Governance of The Internet of Things (IoT), 60(3) JURIMETRICS
315 (2020), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3443973 [https://perma.cc/U4GFF8SS]; Lawrence J. Trautman, Mohammed T. Hussein, Emmanuel U.
Opara, Mason J. Molesky & Shahedur Rahman, Posted: No Phishing, 8
EMORY CORP. GOV. & ACCT. REV. 39, (2021),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3549992 [https://perma.cc/PT77-94JV];
Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Art and Non-fungible Tokens, 50 HOFSTRA
LAW REVIEW (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3814087
[https://perma.cc/G2KN-PNT4].
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and regulation to keep pace.”251 Rapid growth of technology and the
Internet has created challenges for the SEC,252 other regulators,253
Congress,254 corporate directors,255 and all of society.256
251

Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now After
Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 1, 13
(2014), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2393537 [https://perma.cc/7VFU5XDG].
252
Lawrence J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, The SEC & The
Internet: Regulating the Web of Deceit, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 262
(2014), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1951148 [https://perma.cc/LMS3MD3T].
253
David D. Schein & Lawrence J. Trautman, The Dark Web and
Employer Liability, 18 COLO. TECH. L.J., 1, 7 (2019),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3251479 [https://perma.cc/5H89-RQGV];
Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated
Payment Systems: What Gives?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041 (2017),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2730983 [https://perma.cc/P75U-362B];
Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of
Financial Services?, 69 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 232 (2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2786186 [https://perma.cc/HWP9-QHYR].
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Who & How It Works, 5 J. L. & CYBER WARFARE, 1, 17 (2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2638448 [https://perma.cc/Y63H-TXA5];
Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U.
ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 341 (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2548561
[https://perma.cc/YDZ9-CDVK].
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PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, 1, 41(2020), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3363002
[https://perma.cc/QA5R-7T3N]; Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C.
Ormerod, WannaCry, Ransomware, and the Emerging Threat to
Corporations, 86 TENN. L. REV. 503 (2019),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3238293 [https://perma.cc/SH25-QZKY];
Lawrence J. Trautman, How Google Perceives Customer Privacy, Cyber,
E-Commerce, Political and Regulatory Compliance Risks, 10 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2018) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067298
[https://perma.cc/C4US-P2GP]; Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C.
Ormerod, Industrial Cyber Vulnerabilities: Lessons from Stuxnet and the
Internet of Things, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761 (2018),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2982629 [https://perma.cc/76MB-AK5N];
Lawrence J. Trautman, Managing Cyberthreat, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH
TECH. L.J. 230 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2534119
[https://perma.cc/5Q7V-CUNZ]; Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce and
Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons from PayPal, 16 U.C. DAVIS
BUS. L.J. 261 (2016), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2314119
[https://perma.cc/RB5X-R47F]; Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara
Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s Responsibility for Information
Technology Governance, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMP. & INFO. L. 313 (2011),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1947283 [https://perma.cc/DXU3-6RB6];
Lawrence J. Trautman, Jason Triche & James C. Wetherbe, Corporate
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Cybersecurity and Financial Markets
Like all aspects of society, cybersecurity threats impact global
securities markets in numerous and ever-evolving ways too numerous to
cover fully here. Breaches of business systems impact corporations raising
liability issues from loss of customer privacy and information. Just one of
these various exploits is discussed by the SEC’s Office of Compliance
Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) observing “an increase in the
number of cyber-attacks against SEC-registered investment advisers and
brokers and dealers using credential stuffing, a method of cyber-attack to
client accounts that uses compromised client login credentials, resulting in
the possible loss of customer assets and unauthorized disclosure of sensitive
personal information.”257
Innovation and Financial Technology
On December 3, 2020, the SEC announced a new stand-alone
Office known as the Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial
Technology, referred to as “FinHub,” and led by Valerie A. Szczepanik. In
making this announcement, the Commission states:
Established within the Division of Corporation Finance in
2018, FinHub has spearheaded agency efforts to encourage
responsible innovation in the financial sector, including in
evolving areas such as distributed ledger technology and
digital assets, automated investment advice, digital
marketplace financing, and artificial intelligence and
Information Technology Governance Under Fire, 8 J. STRAT. & INT’L
STUD. 105 (2013),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346583
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256
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L. REV. 997 (2020), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3442905
[https://perma.cc/YPX4-HDEN]; Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack
The Next Pearl Harbor?, 18 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 233 (2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2711059 [https://perma.cc/SEP7-23SA];
Lawrence J. Trautman & Janet Ford, Nonprofit Governance: The Basics,
52 AKRON L. REV. 971 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3133818
[https://perma.cc/G4F4-B94P]; Lawrence J. Trautman, How Law
Operates in a Wired Global Society: Cyber and E-Commerce Risk,
PROCEEDS OF THE KOREA LEGISLATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE (KLRI),
2017 LEGAL SCHOLAR ROUNDTABLE, Seoul, Korea, 21–22 Sept., 2017,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3033776 [https://perma.cc/9Q75-BHQM].
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machine learning. Through FinHub, market and technology
innovators as well as domestic and international regulators
have been able to engage with SEC staff on new approaches
to capital formation, trading, and other financial services
within the parameters of the federal securities laws.
Designating FinHub as a stand-alone office strengthens the
SEC's ability to continue fostering innovation in emerging
technologies in our markets consistent with investor
protection. The office will continue to lead the agency's
work to identify and analyze emerging financial
technologies affecting the future of the securities industry,
and engage with market participants, as technologies
develop.258
Virtual Currencies, Tokens, and the ICO Regulation Challenge
Recently, it has been observed that, “The SEC brings more
enforcement actions against cryptoasset issuers, broker-dealers, cryptoexchanges, and other digital market participants than most other major
crypto-jurisdictions, as well as the United States Commodity Futures
Trading Commission. SEC enforcement results in considerably more
serious penalties.”259
VII. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
The home page of the SEC website sets the stage for our discussion
of contemporary challenges by illustrating the broad range of functions
served by the Commission: “we inform and protect investors; we facilitate
capital formation; we enforce federal securities laws; we regulate securities
markets; and we provide data.”260 As might be expected, challenges facing
the SEC are limited only by the imagination of market participants. As a
result, there are always numerous examples of interesting situations and
fact patterns presenting challenges. Due to space limitations, we will now
briefly discuss just a few: the Robinhood-Gamestop market volatility that
takes place during January 2021; and the recent focus by the Commission
on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues and developments.
The Robinhood-GameStop Drama
Year 2021 starts off with a major disruption to the volatility and
stability of trading markets. In yet another example of Internet-related
technology having impact on capital markets unimaginable just a few years
258
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ago, The Wall Street Journal reports that Robinhood Markets Inc’s chief
executive Vlad Teney and “co-founder Baiju Bhatt, had set out eight years
earlier to bring the stock market to a new class of investors. With engineers
plucked from Facebook Inc. and other tech giants, they stripped down the
trading experience and eliminated commissions, making buying stock about
as easy… [as possible].”261 Success followed. Even in a “pandemic, throngs
of amateur investors ̶ homebound, bored and flush with stimulus checks ̶
opened Robinhood accounts to experience the market’s thrills. By the end
of December [2020], the firm had amassed about 20 million users… and
weeks later the app hit the top of the download charts.262 In a memo to
Members and staff of the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services the
January 2021 market volatility and situation resulting in substantial
monetary losses to many investors is described as follows:
Overview
In January 2021, retail investors on social media site
Reddit’s “WallStreetBets” subchannel (“subreddit”)
collectively executed an investment strategy to induce a
short squeeze in stocks such as GameStop, AMC and KOSS,
as well as other securities they identified as being heavily
shorted by hedge funds. Meaning, social media users
collectively drove the stock prices up, forcing short sellers
who bet the stock price would go down, to purchase shares
at an increased price. Reddit user, Keith Gill, notoriously
discussed GameStop stock on Reddit under the username
“DeepF*ckingValue.” Initially, this squeeze led to heavy
losses for some short sellers, particularly hedge funds, and
led to substantial financial gain for some retail investors.
Robinhood, and other broker dealers, placed restrictions on
transactions in these stocks, which received public and
regulatory scrutiny. Eventually, the stock prices started to
decline and many investors were faced with steep financial
losses. For some, the January short squeeze raises questions
regarding whether legislators and regulators should take a
closer look at existing rules governing short sales and related
disclosures, as well as the conflicts between the practice of
payment for order flow and firms’ best execution
obligations. It also raises important questions about the
efficacy of anti-market manipulation laws and whether
technology and social media have outpaced regulation in a
manner that leaves investors and the markets exposed to
unnecessary risks.
Short Selling
261
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When an investor shorts a stock, they borrow the stock,
typically from a broker, and then sells it to another investor.
When the time comes for the borrower to return the
borrowed stock, the borrower will purchase the stock in the
market and return the stock to the lender. In a successful
short sale, the market price of the borrowed stock will fall
below the amount it costs to borrow the stock. When this
happens, the borrower is then able to purchase the stock in
the market at an amount lower than it cost the borrower to
borrow the stock, return the stock to the lender, and keep the
difference as profit. Some investors, such as hedge funds,
engage this trading strategy when they are betting that the
price of the securities will decline and expect they can profit
from that decline. Others use this strategy to hedge against
other market risks. The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has repeatedly noted that short selling
provides liquidity and price efficiency. The SEC has,
however, implemented various rules to curb abusive short
sale practices.263
Reports emerge, “The Reddit-fueled frenzy in stocks such as
GameStop Corp. and AMC Entertainment Holdings Inc. is prompting calls
for regulators to reconsider a decades-old practice in the U.S. stock market:
payment for order flow.”264 Under this arrangement:
In which high-speed trading firms pay brokerages for the
right to execute orders submitted by individual investors, has
long been controversial. Some have said it warps the
incentives of brokers and encourages them to maximize their
revenue at the expense of customers. Supporters, including
many brokers and trading firms, said it helps ensure
investors get seamless executions and good prices on trades.
Last year, brokerages such as Charles Schwab
Corp., TD Ameritrade, Robinhood Markets Inc. and
E*Trade collected nearly $2.6 billion in payments for stock
and option orders, according to JMP Securities. The biggest
sources of the payments were electronic-trading firms such
as Citidel Securities, Susquehanna International Group LLP
and Virtue Financial Inc.
263
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Payment for order flow helped set the stage for the
manic trading in GameStop, whose shares began the year
around $18, surged to a record close of $347.51 on Jan. 27
[2021]…265
In testimony given on February 18, 2021, before the House
Financial Services Committee, Gabriel Plotkin, founder and Chief
Investment Officer of investment Melvin Capital Management states, “we
had been short GameStop since Melvin’s inception six years earlier because
we believed and still believe that its business model ̶ selling new and used
video games in physical stores ̶ is being overtaken by digital downloads
through the internet.”266 Mr. Plotkin further explains, “And that trend only
accelerated in 2020, when, because of the pandemic, people were
downloading video games at home. As a result, the gaming industry had its
best year ever. But GameStop had significant losses.”267 Mr. Melvin
explains the fact pattern resulting in his being asked by the House
Committee to explain the resulting market turmoil as follows:
January Frenzy Untethered to Fundamentals
In January 2021, a group on Reddit began to make posts
about Melvin’s specific investments. They took information
contained in Melvin’s SEC filings and encouraged others to
trade in the opposite direction. Many of these posts were
laced with antisemitic slurs directed at me and others. The
posts said things like “it’s very clear we need a second
holocaust, the jews can’t keep getting away with this.”
Others sent similarly profane and racist text messages to me.
In the frenzy during January, GameStop’s stock rose
from $17 to a peak of $483. I do not think anyone would
claim that that price had any relationship to the intrinsic
value of the company. The unfortunate part of this episode
is that ordinary investors who were convinced by a
misleading frenzy to buy GameStop at $100, $200, or even
$483 have now lost significant amounts.
When this frenzy began, Melvin started closing out
its position in GameStop at a loss, not because our
investment thesis had changed but because something
unprecedented was happening. We also reduced many other
265
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Melvin positions at significant losses – both long and short
– that were the subject of similar posts.268
Relevant securities laws involved with the December 2020-January
2021 GameStop et al., market volatility saga are described by the House
Committee on Financial Services memorandum as follows:
U.S. securities laws prohibit fraud and market manipulation.
Violations of these laws typically involve two categories of
misconduct: (1) the spread false information in order to
affect the price of a security, including pump-and-dump
schemes; and (2) schemes in which bad actors individually
or collectively transact to create false levels of volume or
manipulate the price of a stock.
(i) Section 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933
Section 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 makes it
unlawful for a person to “tout”, or publicize, a stock without
discussing the nature of any payments or other consideration
the person has been, or will be, paid.269
(ii) Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act
Section 9(a)(2) prohibits transactions that directly or
indirectly create actual or apparent active trading to induce
the purchase or sale of a security by others.270 While Section
9 of the Exchange Act prohibits manipulation of securities
prices, it requires the demonstration of specific intent “for
the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security
by others” or “for the purposes of creating a false or
misleading appearance of [market activity].”271
(iii) Rule 10(b)(5) & FINRA Rule 2020
Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful to “employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud”, make material statements
that are false or to omit material facts, or to “engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.”272 To successfully
establish a 10b-5 manipulation claim, the plaintiff must
show that “(1) the defendant made a material misstatement
or omission or used a fraudulent device; (2) she did so with
scienter (that is, intent); (3) her conduct was related to the
purchase or a sale of a security; (4) the plaintiff relied on the
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misstatement; and (5) the plaintiff was harmed.”273 Rule
10(b)(5) is very broadly applied in various types of
manipulation practices, including “marking the close,”
spoofing, scalping, etc. This is because “under Rule 10b-5,
the fraudulent conduct alone can be indicative of the
manipulator’s deceptive intent.”274 Similarly, FINRA rule
2020 prevents FINRA members from making sales or
purchases through manipulative, fraud or deceit.275
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Issues
The CFA Institute reports that, “ESG stands for Environmental,
Social, and Governance. Investors are increasingly applying these nonfinancial factors as part of their analysis process to identify material risks and
growth opportunities.”276 In addition, “ESG metrics are not commonly part
of mandatory part of financial reporting, though companies are increasingly
making disclosures in their annual report or in a standalone sustainability
report.”277
Efforts are now underway to define materiality, standards, and to
incorporate these concepts into the investment process by such organizations
as: the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI); the Sustainability Accounting
Standards Board (SASB); and Task Force on Climate-related Financial
Disclosures (TCFD), just to name a few.278 Among recent trends, “As ESG
investing accelerates in demand, several trends are emerging ̶ from climate
change to social unrest. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, has
intensified discussions about the interconnectedness of sustainability and the
financial system.”279 The SEC’s March 4, 2021 press release, reproduced
below as Exhibit 11, depicts the recent focus by the Commission on climate
and ESG issues.
Exhibit 11
SEC Announces Enforcement Task Force Focused on Climate and ESG
Issues
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2021-42
Washington D.C., March 4, 2021 —
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The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced
the creation of a Climate and ESG Task Force in the Division
of Enforcement. The task force will be led by Kelly L.
Gibson, the Acting Deputy Director of Enforcement, who
will oversee a Division-wide effort, with 22 members drawn
from the SEC’s headquarters, regional offices, and
Enforcement specialized units.
Consistent with increasing investor focus and
reliance on climate and ESG-related disclosure and
investment, the Climate and ESG Task Force will develop
initiatives to proactively identify ESG-related misconduct.
The task force will also coordinate the effective use of
Division resources, including through the use of
sophisticated data analysis to mine and assess information
across registrants, to identify potential violations.
The initial focus will be to identify any material gaps
or misstatements in issuers’ disclosure of climate risks under
existing rules. The task force will also analyze disclosure
and compliance issues relating to investment advisers’ and
funds’ ESG strategies. Its work will complement the
agency’s other initiatives in this area, including the recent
appointment of Satyam Khanna as a Senior Policy Advisor
for Climate and ESG. As an integral component of the
agency’s efforts to address these risks to investors, the task
force will work closely with other SEC Divisions and
Offices, including the Divisions of Corporation Finance,
Investment Management, and Examinations.
“Climate risks and sustainability are critical issues
for the investing public and our capital markets,” said Acting
Chair Allison Herren Lee. “The task force announced today
will play an important role in enhancing and coordinating
the efforts of the Division of Enforcement, the Office of the
Whistleblower, and other parts of the agency to bolster the
efforts of the Commission as a whole on these vital matters.”
“Proactively addressing emerging disclosure gaps
that threaten investors and the market has always been core
to the SEC’s mission,” said Acting Deputy Director of
Enforcement Kelly L. Gibson, who will lead the task force.
“This task force brings together a broad array of experience
and expertise, which will allow us to better police the
market, pursue misconduct, and protect investors.”
In addition, the Climate and ESG Task Force will
evaluate and pursue tips, referrals, and whistleblower
complaints on ESG-related issues, and provide expertise and
insight to teams working on ESG-related matters across the
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Division. ESG related tips, referrals and whistleblower
complaints can be submitted here.280
VIII.CONCLUSION
During recent years, rapid technological change has resulted in
novel regulatory issues and challenges, as law and policy struggles to keep
pace. It is the role and responsibility of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission to monitor, regulate, and ensure that the U.S. capital markets
continue as the deepest, most dynamic, and most liquid in the world. To a
considerable extent, the success or failure of our society, jobs of a global
workplace, and the ability of families everywhere to feed, clothe, and house
themselves depends on the success of the SEC in providing fair and open
access to capital through efficient markets.
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